By Kenneth R. L. Parker

There are a number of areas in which copyright law appears to have lagged behind technological advancement, including fan fiction, web videos that incorporate copyrighted elements, songs that sample from earlier copyrighted recordings, and online user-generated content. Each of these types of “gray works” has been the subject of scholarship. However, one class of gray works that has received considerably less scrutiny is forwarded emails. While forwarding emails is a common practice, it may also constitute copyright infringement.

On its face, an email message appears to merit the same level of copyright protection as a written letter, since the copyrighting process is automatic at the time a writing is fixed in a tangible form and electronic communication has been construed to be tangible for purposes of copyright. Copying or distributing a copyrighted work, absent an applicable defense, constitutes infringement. Just as copying and distributing a letter violates the author’s copyright in the letter, forwarding an email or copying its contents to a web page appears to make out the prima facie case for copyright infringement. Is there a defense or exception under which email forwarding is not copyright infringement or is the law merely ignored by email authors and forwarders alike?

Part I of this article examines under what circumstances emails are copyrighted works. Part II explores possible defenses to infringement, including implied licenses and fair use, and concludes that neither defense is consistently applicable to email forwarding. Part III discusses the implications of email forwarding constituting copyright infringement.

By David Houlihan

Chapter 156E of Massachusetts General Laws became effective on December 1, 2012, enabling the formation of benefit corporations, entities that incorporate concern for public welfare into private enterprise. Massachusetts is the eleventh state to adopt benefit corporation legislation, with the District of Columbia recently following and other states planning similar statutes.

Roughly speaking, Chapter 156E is an attempt to create a corporate form that enforces investors’ social and public welfare concerns. As this article will demonstrate, Chapter 156E represents an imperfect effort at best.

By Tom Maxim

Massachusetts law allows principals to suspend students when (1) a felony complaint has been issued against the student, and (2) in the opinion of the principal, the student’s presence at school would pose a substantial detrimental effect on the general welfare of the school. The relevant statute, Massachusetts General Laws chapter 71, section 37H1/2, does not explicitly require the alleged felony to be violent, nor does it require any connection to the welfare of the school. Also, case law interpreting section 37H1/2 allows, principals to consider on-campus conduct that does not rise to the level of suspension, such as a student’s grades.

Section 37H1/2 should be narrowed for three reasons. First, it violates the privacy rights of juvenile delinquents under another Massachusetts statute. Second, it is broader than what the legislature intended. Third, it violates a rational basis challenge under equal protection and due process. Instead of applying the statute to nonviolent juvenile delinquents, courts must limit it to violent youthful offenders whose charges are connected with the school environment.

By Ryan J. Dobens

Many Americans are now yearning to create an energy infrastructure with renewable energy at the foundation. Environmental concerns have caused policy makers to join other advocates and provide subsidies for various renewable and energy efficient technologies through the tax code. Part I of this article reviews the history of modern energy tax incentives.  Part II discusses the efficacy of the expired grants in lieu of tax credits (“1603 Grants”) program that was adopted by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“ARRA”), and concludes that the program was effective and should be restored.  Part III addresses the possibility of expanding the 1603 Grants program to individuals who wish to pursue renewable energy at their personal residences. The restoration of the 1603 Grant program—and the extension of such grants to individuals—would even the playing field for American families interested in pursuing a greener future and continue progress toward making U.S. energy consumption sustainable over the long term.

By Jessalyn Schwartz

By the time children and adolescents reach the foster care system, they have experienced myriad challenges which may cause compound mental health and behavioral issues. Accordingly, foster care youth often have trouble understanding their situations, managing their emotions, communicating their needs, and advocating for their own well-being. These children are being prescribed medications too often, too young, and far too much. Approximately thirty-seven percent of children in the foster care system take at least one psychotropic medication, with approximately twenty percent of these children taking two or more medications at any given time. In many states, the percentages are much higher and the use of medication increases with the age of the child.

By Eliza Lockhart-Jenks

In June 2012, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that adults and juveniles—even those convicted of major offenses—are fundamentally different and entitled to different sentencing standards.  In Miller v. Alabama , the Supreme Court decreed that courts must consider mitigating factors in a juvenile’s life when the juvenile faces a possible sentence of life without parole (LWOP); in other words, mandatory LWOP sentences will no longer apply to minors.  Before this decision, state legislatures could and, in many cases, did mandate LWOP sentences for certain crimes, regardless of the offender’s age.  In Miller, the Supreme Court held that the failure to consider mitigating factors, including age, when sentencing a juvenile to LWOP constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.