Northeastern University Law Review
Missing the Bus: The Promise and Failure of the ...

By Thomas Hislop

In 1965, Massachusetts became the first state in the nation to enact a law that directly addressed racial imbalances in its public schools.[1] Championing the legacy of Brown v. Board of Education (1954) (“Brown”), the Racial Imbalance Act (“the RIA”) strived for “promotion of racial balance and the correction of existing racial imbalance in the public schools.”[2] This unprecedented legislation, however, never achieved its purpose. A court order designed to implement the RIA that required Boston public schools to integrate was met with fierce opposition and, eventually, prompted significant white flight.[3] Today, Boston public schools are more segregated than they were sixty years ago.[4]


[1] Dennis Ford Eagan, Note, The Past, Present, and Future of School Desegregation Law in Massachusetts, 34 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 541, 556 (2001).

[2] Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37C (1965).

[3] See infra notes 44-54.

[4] See Christina Pazzanese, Boston Busing in 1974 Was About Race. Now The Issue Is Class, The Harv. Gazette (June 18, 2024), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2024/06/school-reform-expert-on-50-year-legacy-of-boston-busing/#:~:text=Current%20enrollment%20is%20now%20roughly,mental%20health%20and%20behavioral%20problems (“Students of color are now more racially isolated in Boston public schools than ever before.”); Desegregation Busing, Bos. Rsch. Ctr., https://bostonresearchcenter.org/projects_files/eob/single-entry-busing.html (“As of 2018, more than half of Boston Public Schools are profoundly segregated, more so than they were in 1965.”).

Northeastern University Law Review
Reforming Res Judicata for the Sake of Diffuse ...

By Cansu Koça

This article discusses the contemporary challenges of diffuse interest class actions. The primary issue is the limited access to justice for members of the diffuse class, exacerbated by the res judicata principle and inadequate due protection mechanisms. Therefore, the intricate process of certifying a diffuse class and ensuring adequate representation will be addressed. Concerns regarding the inability of various notice methods to reach all members of the diffuse class will also be highlighted, further underscoring the need for comprehensive reform. Drawing insights from innovative approaches in countries like Brazil and Argentina, this article proposes a nuanced res judicata framework in the U.S. that addresses adequacy concerns and upholds the principle of due process, while navigating the complexities of diffuse interest class actions.

Northeastern University Law Review
An Analysis of the Current U.S. Regulatory ...

By Joseph Steinbach

For the past decade, cryptocurrency companies have found themselves squarely in the crosshairs of litigation initiated by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). The question that is currently dominating the courtroom in this arena is whether the sale of a company’s key digital assets, commonly referred to as “cryptocurrency” or "crypto," constitutes the sale of securities under federal law.Tasked with overseeing the securities market, the SEC seeks to ensure safe and fair participation in federal securities exchanges. With recent scandals and accusations of fraud plaguing major players in the industry, the SEC is now taking a firmer regulatory stance than it had in the past. Today, circuit splits concerning the applicable regulatory framework and the appropriate definition of  “securities” continue to fuel the fire of this contentious debate.

Northeastern University Law Review
What is a “Meaningful Opportunity?” Disparities ...

BY EILIDH CURRIE

When it comes to criminal culpability, the Supreme Court has consistently treated children in a manner different than adults. Because of this understanding, the Court has recognized that sentences of life without parole may be too harsh for minors. The Court has banned mandatory juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) but permits courts to issue discretionary JLWOP sentences. The Supreme Court also permits courts to impose lengthy sentences, often called “virtual” or “de facto” life sentences. However, when issuing these lengthy sentences, courts must ensure that a minor retains a meaningful opportunity for release. Striking this balance is a challenge for sentencing courts: how long of a sentence is too long? Which sentences equate to JLWOP? What is a meaningful opportunity?…

The Bulger Complex: Common Conception of Organized Crime Leads to an Impracticable Nexus Requirement in Massachusetts Wiretap Statute

By Jess Megee

Famous tales of groups implementing violent means to further their illegal business operations have shaped the common conception of organized crime in Massachusetts. In response to this type of crime, the Massachusetts legislature enacted Massachusetts General Law ch. 272, § 99 (Section 99), which authorized police to use wiretaps to investigate organized criminal activity. Section 99 substantially relies on this common conception of organized crime, only authorizing wiretaps where criminals have committed a “designated offense” in connection with “the organized criminal trade.” This standard, however, has become impracticable in the modern criminal landscape.

The issue with Section 99’s efficacy is a direct result of the type of criminal activity prevalent in Boston. Since the fall of La Cosa Nostra and Whitey Bulger’s Winter Hill Gang, an array of highly territorial “street gangs” have dominated Boston’s underworld.” Although these entities engage in many of the same criminal operations as their more famous predecessors, they do so with less clear and defined motives. The difficulty in deciphering a clear motive renders the standard for upholding single-person consent wiretaps far too exacting to investigate gang related criminal activity. In particular, Section 99 proves inadequate as a tool to investigate gang violence, which is commonly motivated by retaliation, longstanding feuds and stature in the community, rather than any pecuniary end.

Ubiquitous Eyes Above: Should Existing Fourth Amendment Precedent Apply to Drone Surveillance?

By John E. Murray

Unmanned Aircraft Systems, commonly referred to as drones, have the potential to transform our lives, from providing package delivery to serving as hovering wi-fi beacons. Although drones are most often associated with surveillance in combat zones, civilian law enforcement agencies have not yet widely utilized drones for surveillance. The Supreme Court has held that civilian law enforcement agencies may use manned aircraft for surveillance without engaging in a “search” under the Fourth Amendment and may do so without a warrant. If this precedent were to apply to drone surveillance, civilian law enforcement agencies would effectively have carte blanche to conduct warrantless drone surveillance on citizens.

Unpatentably Preemptive? A Case Against the Use of Preemption as a Guidepost for Determining Patent Eligibility

By Arpita Bhattacharyya

The terms “process, machine, manufacture, and composition of matter” in Section 101 of the U.S. Patent Act provide an expansive scope for patentable subject matter. To rein in this vast scope, the United States Supreme Court decreed that “laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas” are outside the ambit of patentable inventions. Thus far, the Supreme Court has failed to provide any clear rationale for such per se exclusion, except for frequently raising preemption concerns in its analysis of subject matter exclusion, thus frustrating the application of the patentable subject matter doctrine to emerging technologies, such as genetics, medical diagnostics, computer software, and business methods.

Compelled Political Speech in Recent Supreme Court Jurisprudence: (Un)principled Variations in Protection by Speaker

By Jeremiah W. Meyer-O’Day

In Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, the Supreme Court further restricted conditions on when unions may exact dues from agency-fee paying non-member employees. The Court’s heightened concern for the rights of employees of union shops who opt not to become members of the union contrasts with the lack of concern for the rights of dissenting shareholders in the context of corporate political advocacy. This article shows the discrepancy in the Court’s treatment of compelled speech and association seems to depend on the identity of the entity doing the compelling, and then poses questions regarding that discrepancy.

Use and Abuse of Joinder in Copyright Infringement Actions

By Michael Hart

In recent years federal district courts have been inundated with a new kind of civil plaintiff known as the “copyright troll.” A plaintiff will file a claim seeking “damages for infringement upon a copyright it owns, not to be made whole, but rather as a primary or supplemental revenue stream.” Typically, these plaintiffs file a single complaint joining “tens, hundreds or thousands of individuals based on their IP addresses” for sharing a protected file across a peer-to-peer (P2P) network. Plaintiffs then move for early discovery to subpoena the identity of each Doe defendant from the service provider and send a settlement demand letter. Plaintiffs profit because some defendants feel compelled to settle rather than risk facing $150,000 in statutory damages along with court costs. Additionally, because some of the files being shared on P2P networks are pornographic films, defendants may be even more compelled to settle rather than be named as an illegal downloader of pornography. The key to all of this is large-scale joinder, that allows plaintiffs to save thousands if not millions of dollars in filing fees in order to facilitate this process.

This article discusses the use of permissive joinder in copyright troll litigation under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Do Not Forward: Why Passing Along an Email May Constitute Copyright Infringement

By Kenneth R. L. Parker

There are a number of areas in which copyright law appears to have lagged behind technological advancement, including fan fiction, web videos that incorporate copyrighted elements, songs that sample from earlier copyrighted recordings, and online user-generated content. Each of these types of “gray works” has been the subject of scholarship. However, one class of gray works that has received considerably less scrutiny is forwarded emails. While forwarding emails is a common practice, it may also constitute copyright infringement.

On its face, an email message appears to merit the same level of copyright protection as a written letter, since the copyrighting process is automatic at the time a writing is fixed in a tangible form and electronic communication has been construed to be tangible for purposes of copyright. Copying or distributing a copyrighted work, absent an applicable defense, constitutes infringement. Just as copying and distributing a letter violates the author’s copyright in the letter, forwarding an email or copying its contents to a web page appears to make out the prima facie case for copyright infringement. Is there a defense or exception under which email forwarding is not copyright infringement or is the law merely ignored by email authors and forwarders alike?

Part I of this article examines under what circumstances emails are copyrighted works. Part II explores possible defenses to infringement, including implied licenses and fair use, and concludes that neither defense is consistently applicable to email forwarding. Part III discusses the implications of email forwarding constituting copyright infringement.