Sarah Pavlini*
This note argues that the Justice Department (DOJ) should reconsider the soundness of its categorical policy against indicting sitting presidents. This policy, entitled “A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution,” has long been based on the following principles: that (1) indicting a sitting president would unconstitutionally undermine the ability of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions; (2) immunity from criminal immunity while in office does not make presidents “above the law” because they are only immune from criminal liability for the length of their term and can therefore be indicted and prosecuted once their term ends; and (3) when there is a need for the president’s immediate prosecution and punishment, Congress will remove the president from office via impeachment proceedings, thereby making him or her available for criminal proceedings pursuant to a clear constitutional provision authorizing that action. However, the nation cannot always afford to wait for a president to leave office in order for him or her to face the consequences of his or her criminal conduct. Impeachment, the Constitution’s explicit tool for effecting a president’s immediate removal from office, has shown itself to be a far less reliable safeguard against serious presidential criminal activity than is ideal. DOJ policy regarding the indictment of sitting presidents should better reflect this reality . . .