The Status of Citizenship

By Yakov Malkiel

Immigration laws control transitions between “alienhood” and citizenship.[1]  These two legal categories are statuses:  that is, they assign rights and obligations to people based on their unchosen characteristics, in this case their birthplaces and their parents’ identities.  The arc of legal history has bent away from relying on statuses and toward treating all people as equals.  By continuing to revolve around statuses, our immigration laws thus reflect attitudes that we have mostly rejected.

I.  From “Aliens” to Citizens

Like many before it, this election cycle has placed immigration at center stage.  Some presidential candidates have described the rate at which noncitizens are entering the United States as a crisis and an important failing of the current administration.  Longstanding pressure on the President has culminated in his recent Proclamation on Securing the Border.  At times like this, it is important to revisit the underpinnings of our jurisprudential attitudes toward immigration and the laws that control it.

The immigration laws determine whether and when “aliens” may become “citizens.”  Our legal system draws a sharp distinction between these two categories of people.  The distinction determines an array of legal rights and obligations.  Typically, only citizens are entitled to vote and to hold office.  Citizens receive special constitutional protections and governmental benefits.  And noncitizens may be removed from the country’s territory.

Two key factors determine a person’s access to citizenship.  Both are “beyond the[] control” of anyone:  they are (1) the person’s place of birth and (2) the identities of the person’s parents.  In essence, you may have a right to U.S. citizenship if you were born on U.S. soil or if your parents are U.S. citizens.  The pathways to citizenship of anyone who was born abroad to non-citizen parents are narrow and uncertain.

The traditional name for a legal category that assigns rights and obligations to people based on unchosen characteristics is a “status.”  English scholar Edward Jenks classically defined statuses as groups of people that the law treats differently because of “conspicuous differences . . . that by no decision of their own can they get rid of.”  That definition remains in use.  It aptly describes both citizenship and “alienhood” under today’s laws.

II.  From Status to Equality

Few theories about the history of law and society have been as influential as Sir Henry Sumner Maine’s aphorism that “the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.”  Scholars say that Maine’s usage of the term “status” mirrored Jenks’s:  Maine also meant a legal category that assigns rights and obligations to people based on their unchosen characteristics.

Maine viewed his theory as both descriptive and prescriptive.  He thought that, as a matter of historical fact, the law has gradually been assigning rights and obligations less on the basis of unchosen statuses, and more on the basis of voluntary arrangements.  Maine also approved of this development, as indicated by his use of the adjective “progressive.”

For present purposes, it is important to disaggregate the “from status” and “to contract” halves of Maine’s theory.  The “to contract” half has drawn overwhelming critiques.  The critics have observed that modern legal systems have limited the extent to which contracts are permitted to dictate legal consequences.  Statutes and regulations control rights and obligations that people cannot always modify.  The same critics have emphasized the virtues of restrictions on contractual freedom:  such restrictions can deliver benefits to the public and protect the people who most need protecting (such as underage work seekers).

By comparison, quarrels with the “from status” half of Maine’s theory have been essentially semantic.  Almost as soon as Maine articulated his aphorism, scholars began to point out that the law continues to recognize new types of statuses, such as “employee,” “insured,” “tenant,” and “shipper.”  Of course, these are not the types of categories that arise out of people’s unchosen attributes.  They depend on voluntary acts, such as the acceptance of a job offer.  To the extent that such legal categories are now commonly called “statuses,” the logical critique of Maine is that he (and Jenks) used the term “status” in an outdatedly narrow sense.

Setting semantics aside, the “from status” half of Maine’s theory continues to offer vibrant lessons.  Like Maine’s aphorism overall, these lessons are both prescriptive and descriptive.

The theory that the law is gradually moving away from assigning rights and obligations based on unchosen characteristics reflects an appealing prescriptive principle:  the belief that all people are born equal.  That belief is the essential opposite of the traditional assumption that rights and responsibilities are appropriately assigned on the basis of unchosen characteristics.  Jenks recognized this point, writing that the ancient proliferation of statuses has waned “as a result of the modern tendency towards legal equality.”  The prescriptive teaching of Maine’s aphorism is that the law should steadily eliminate statuses and replace them with equal protections.

The corresponding descriptive proposition is that, from a bird’s eye view, the arc of legal history has bent away from status and toward equality.  This observation should not be allowed to obscure the unacceptable inequalities of both our history and our present.  But it is supported by certain datapoints.  Writing in 1861, Maine himself was especially interested in the law’s abandonment of the feudal statuses of “noble,” “vassal,” and “serf.”  Two years later, the Emancipation Proclamation ended American slavery.  In 1920, the Nineteenth Amendment equalized the voting rights of men and women.  During the fifties and sixties, some legal consequences of African-American heredity were outlawed by Brown and Loving.  The Civil Rights Acts of the sixties tackled additional unequal consequences of gender and race.  Recent decisions such as Windsor, Obergefell, and Bostock have made analogous efforts to equalize the legal implications of all sexual orientations.

Each one of these developments has reflected a reduced role for status in the law and a corresponding expansion of legal equality.  Each one has been a step toward disentangling people’s rights and obligations from their unchosen attributes.  Each one has enlarged the universe of people whose unchosen attributes are legally irrelevant and who are instead treated as equals.

III.  From Outlaws to Siblings

Citizenship and “alienhood” have survived the law’s gradual rejection of status as an acceptable regulatory device.  The Supreme Court made this clear in Mathews v. Diaz, stating matter-of-factly that “a host of constitutional and statutory provisions rest on the premise that a legitimate distinction between citizens and [‘]aliens[’] may justify attributes and benefits for one class not accorded to the other.”

The persistence of these two statuses is a puzzle.  Why exactly does the law continue to assign divergent rights and obligations to people based on their places of birth and their parents’ identities?  We rarely see this question posed, perhaps because citizenship and “alienhood” are categories so time-honored that they seem natural.  But it is puzzling that these categories have remained vital even as we have jettisoned the law’s traditional willingness to derive rights and obligations from nobility, vassalhood, serfdom, slavery, race, gender, and sexual orientation.

Logically speaking, there may be two fundamental approaches toward explaining the continued vitality of citizenship and “alienhood.”  One is that our society truly views noncitizens as unequal people.  Maybe we have come only so far from those Founders who believed that all people are born equal, as long as they are born male and white.  The analogous view today may be that all people are born equal, as long as they are born on U.S. soil or to American parents.  Some political and philosophical thought seems to be satisfied implicitly with this type of attitude.

A second explanation is less ideological and more practical or apologetic.  Perhaps we believe that noncitizens deserve equal treatment, but that we aren’t equipped to provide it.  Maybe there are more rights-deserving people in the world than the United States is able to accommodate.  It still may be puzzling that among all the rights-deserving people, we choose to favor the citizens; but perhaps that reality is too deeply ingrained to be upended just yet.

The existence of these two explanations does not end the analysis.  Each of them yields very different policy implications.  In a nutshell, if only practical constraints curb the degree to which we grant equal treatment to noncitizens, then we should be maximizing—to the extent that reality tolerates—the number of noncitizens we naturalize, as well as the scope of the rights that we make available to noncitizens.  Such efforts are unnecessary if we are content to view noncitizens as unequal.

Our fundamental attitude toward noncitizens may specially impact our attitudes toward those who attempt to immigrate in violation of the applicable laws.  In his Letter from Birmingham City Jail, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. described the experience of the holders of an unequal status upon being told to obey the laws that enforce that status.  Dr. King’s topic was segregation based on race, not exclusion based on parentage and place of birth.  But the parallels are distinct:

All segregation statutes are unjust because segregation distorts the soul and damages the personality.  It gives the segregator a false sense of superiority and the segregated a false sense of inferiority.  Segregation . . . ends up relegating persons to the status of things.

An unjust law is a code that a numerical or power majority group compels a minority group to obey but does not make binding on itself.  This is difference made legal. . . .  A law is unjust if it is inflicted on a minority that, as a result of being denied the right to vote, had no part in enacting or devising the law.

People bearing the more-powerful status of citizenship are those who make the laws that deny various legal rights to people bearing the less-powerful status of “alienhood.”  When we call on noncitizens to obey those laws, we ought to ask ourselves:  Are we treating them as equals?  Would we find such laws acceptable as applied to our siblings?  Dr. King described the resulting practical dilemma as follows:  “Will we be extremists for hate or for love?  Will we be extremists for the preservation of injustice or for the extension of justice?”

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[1] The Law Review considers the terms 'aliens' and 'alienhood' to be degrading and harmful. While we discourage their use, they are employed here to underscore the negative and exclusionary language historically and currently used by the legal system toward noncitizens.

The author is a graduate of Tel-Aviv University (LL.B.) and Yale Law School (LL.M.). Among other responsibilities, he is an adjunct professor at New England Law Boston.  This essay is dedicated to the memory of Analisa R. Smith-Perez, an extremist for love and justice who is badly missed.

A New One-Two Punch in Merger Law? JetBlue’s “Extra-Legal” Negotiation Strategy

By Luke Colomey

The History & Contemporary Landscape of Antitrust Law 

Congress originally designed antitrust law to protect consumers and businesses from the dangers of anti-competitive conduct. At the turn of the century, the Sherman Act (1890) and the Clayton Act (1914) established the framework under which this system functions. Since then, the tools for protecting consumers and businesses have changed little. What has changed is how and when governments and private individuals deploy these tools.

Under § 2 of the Sherman Act it is unlawful for any person to “monopolize,” “attempt to monopolize,” or “conspire to monopolize” any market. An early and important example of a successful challenge to a monopoly under this section was the Standard Oil case in 1911, ordering the nationwide oil juggernaut to be split into separate companies. Antitrust enforcement remained relatively robust in subsequent decades, but the 1980s landmark AT&T litigation represented the start of a more “hands off” approach as the world entered the digital age. The recent Department of Justice (“DOJ”) challenge to Google and the private challenges to both Google and Apple, among other cases, seem to signal a return to a more robust stance against monopolies.

There has been a similar trend in challenging anti-competitive mergers under § 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits any merger or acquisition whose effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” In 2023, the Biden Administration noted that “markets have become more concentrated” since the release of the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (created by the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission), coinciding with “a number of concerning trends across the broader macroeconomy.” In response to these concerns, the two responsible agencies updated the guidelines, seeming to signal a shift in the federal government’s anti-competition policy. The new guidelines have lowered the legal standard for when mergers can and should be challenged, creating a much stronger enforcement policy than the previous incarnation.

The DOJ wasted little time implementing its new marching orders. In 2023, the DOJ challenged JetBlue Airways Corporation’s (“JetBlue”) “Northeast Alliance,” launched in 2021, with American Airlines (“American”), which combined the assets of the two companies in the Northeastern states. A Massachusetts District Court ruled that the alliance was anti-competitive under § 1 of the Sherman Act, which outlaws “every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade,” because the collusion between the airlines in the form of “sharing profits or revenues and coordinating schedules and output,” posed too much danger to be permitted. The DOJ followed that victory with another, succeeding again in challenging JetBlue’s merger with Spirit Airlines (“Spirit”) in 2024, where the court held that the merger was anti-competitive under § 7 of the Clayton Act. This article aims to offer insight into the “extra-legal” negotiation strategy defendant JetBlue employed during the second case.  

The JetBlue-Spirit Merger Trial 

At trial, the DOJ and JetBlue both attempted to establish the foundational elements of a horizontal merger case, including: (1) defining a relevant product and geographic market (the DOJ advocated for regional markets, while JetBlue advocated for a national market); (2) the concentration of said market; (3) the potential pro-competitive effects; and (4) the potential harm to consumers. An important note is that a central argument from the DOJ was that Spirit is an “Ultra Low Cost Carrier” (ULCC) and removing its low prices from the market would not be timely and effectively replaced, thus harming consumers who rely on that service.

A particularly interesting (albeit small) argument from JetBlue involved its use of the Massachusetts District Court opinion that blocked its attempted alliance with American. In that ruling, the Court found that JetBlue qualifies as a so-called “maverick” firm–a disruptor in the relevant market. In holding that the alliance was anti-competitive, presiding Judge Sorokin noted that “by aligning its interests with a powerful [Global Network Carrier], JetBlue has sacrificed a degree of its independence and weakened its status as an important ‘maverick’ competitor in the industry.” During the second trial, defendant JetBlue pointed to this finding as a reason why the merger with Spirit should be allowed. JetBlue argued that if it is not allowed to partner with one of the leading four airlines in the country (American) because the market cannot afford to lose its “maverick” firm, then JetBlue should be allowed to merge with an airline smaller than itself (Spirit) so that it can more effectively disrupt the market, compete against the “Big Four” airlines, and benefit consumers. And indeed, Judge Young, presiding over the merger with Spirit, also recognized that JetBlue is a “maverick” in the market. 

JetBlue continued this strategy by making additional arguments for not only why the merger with Spirit was generally acceptable (a standard argument in a merger case), but also, at least implicitly, why the proposed merger was more acceptable than the previous attempted alliance with American (an “extra-legal” argument that had no bearing on the relevant law, but which JetBlue thought might be persuasive). Unlike American, which projects to be a stable company well into the future, JetBlue argued that Spirit is a “failing firm” that will leave the market in short order should the proposed merger not occur. Unlike the deal with American, where JetBlue’s outlook was all gains and no losses, JetBlue offered to include divestitures in the Spirit deal, which would prop up other ULCCs such as Frontier Airlines and Allegiant Air who could replace Spirit in the long term. Defendant JetBlue did everything in its power to frame the merger with Spirit as significantly more reasonable than the failed “Northeast Alliance.”

While each antitrust horizontal merger case is insular, the surrounding facts are still practically instructive. JetBlue wanted to take advantage of this reality. Putting it simply, once the “Northeast Alliance” was struck down, JetBlue tried to make the best out of its situation and attempted a classic negotiation strategy: using a first, outrageous offer (the alliance with American) to make a second proposal seem much more reasonable in comparison (the merger with Spirit). The problem is that the goal of antitrust law is not to negotiate with corporations to find the least harmful proposal they will accept; it is to prevent conduct that unreasonably harms competition – full stop. Therefore, it does not matter that the Spirit merger is better than the alliance with American; it only matters whether the Spirit merger is anti-competitive. While it is unfortunate for JetBlue that its previous proposal failed, this fact holds no weight in the subsequent case, and JetBlue should not have expected the Court to consider it.

The JetBlue-Spirit Merger Decision

Just over a month after the trial concluded, Judge Young followed antitrust precedent to rule that the merger was anti-competitive, violated § 7 of the Clayton Act, and had to be enjoined. Putting aside JetBlue’s “maverick” firm status, Judge Young instead focused on the disruptive nature of Spirit that would be lost should the merger occur. He also found the argument that Spirit was a “failing” or “flailing” firm “lack[ed] merit” and that the offered divestitures were not enough to deflect from the fact that “those who must rely on Spirit” would be detrimentally harmed.

However, aided by the DOJ agreeing that “another deal is another case,” Judge Young ultimately thought that a general injunction “asks too much.” Instead, he held that the injunction “narrowly applies only to the proposed merger of JetBlue and Spirit as it currently stands.” This aspect of the ruling was noteworthy, as any future proposal of a JetBlue-Spirit merger would undoubtedly involve Spirit leaving the market; the very thing that Judge Young found unacceptable. With that being said, the Court could have been holding back to account for any significant change in the market that would alter the analysis. In the end, Judge Young saw through JetBlue’s “extra-legal” negotiation strategy and blocked the deal, albeit while still leaving the door open for a (probably greatly) modified proposal in the future. 

On March 4, 2024, JetBlue and Spirit announced that they had agreed to terminate their proposed merger due to difficulty in “receiving necessary legal and regulatory approvals.”

Conclusion 

Judge Young made sure to note that “the Court has made its best attempt (emphasis added) to apply the law, perhaps signifying that this was a particularly difficult case. And rightfully so, as antitrust is one of the less exact areas of the law and dueling experts are required to explain complex economic concepts unique to the field. Further, antitrust cases are rarely litigated and the ones that courts do hear require judges to undertake the impossible task of “predict[ing] the future.” For these reasons, it is difficult for any judge to jump into the world of antitrust law and effectively hear a case under its purview. With all of that said, it certainly does not help if defendants employ the types of “extra-legal” negotiation strategies that JetBlue used in this case. If antitrust law is to continue its reawakening and once again fulfill its mission of protecting consumers and businesses alike from anti-competitive behavior, judges must follow in Judge Young’s footsteps, be wary of litigants repeating this strategy in the future and hold closely to the relevant law to prevent any unreasonable harm to competition.

About the Author

Luke Colomey attended high school in Cumberland, Rhode Island, and graduated with a Bachelor’s in Political Science from the University of New England in Biddeford, Maine. He is currently pursuing his J.D. at Northeastern University School of Law in Boston, Massachusetts. This summer he is a law clerk at Brody, Hardoon, Perkins & Kesten in Boston.

Acknowledgments

Thank you to Professor Gary Cooper for his instruction during his Antitrust Law class which laid the foundation for this article. Thank you to J.D. candidates Andrew Turnbull and Jack Sheehy for their edits and ideas. Thank you to the AUSAs in the ACE and CRU units of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Boston, Massachusetts, for their facilitation of the opportunity to observe the United States v. JetBlue trial.

Another Right Bites the Dust

Another Right Bites the Dust

By Nazo Demirdjian

On December 13, 2023, the United States Supreme Court announced it will consider the future of Mifepristone­­–a pill used for medical abortions. The Supreme Court will decide whether the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) 2016 and 2021 approvals were proper or erroneous. The 2016 and 2021 FDA approvals concerned, respectively, the timeline of prescribing the pill and allowing prescriptions of the pill without a supervising physician to administer the drug. Only two years after the Supreme Court overruled Roe v. Wade in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, it will once again insert itself into the reproductive lives of Americans.

HHS Proposes to Combat Abortion Bans by Protecting Reproductive Health Records

HHS Proposes to Combat Abortion Bans by Protecting Reproductive Health Records

The decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, issued on June 24, 2022, upended five decades of the right to abortion overnight, triggering a flurry of policy changes at both the state and federal levels. In 13 states, the Dobbs decision meant a near-immediate end to most legal abortions—these states all had previously enacted “trigger bans,” written to go into effect immediately upon Roe v. Wade’s overturning. Amid this drastic shift in abortion policy, President Biden issued an Executive Order aimed at safeguarding access to reproductive health services. The Executive Order mobilized several federal agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), to report and act on different ways that reproductive care could be protected.

Redlining: An Environmental Injustice

Redlining: An Environmental Injustice

By Rebecca Collins

If you feel like the summers are getting hotter, they are. The world is warming, and hotter weather not only impacts the environment but also impacts our health. Some neighborhoods feel the effects of our warming world more than others. Average temperatures in the lower forty-eight states have been rising slowly since 1901, at an average rate of 0.17 degrees Fahrenheit per decade. However, since the 1970s this rate has increased significantly to between 0.32 degrees Fahrenheit and 0.55 degrees Fahrenheit per decade in the United States (“U.S.”). The global average rate of warming remains at 0.32 degrees Fahrenheit, meaning that parts of the U.S. have warmed faster than the global average rate.