By Jordan L. Payne

This paper will first address the competing frames within the contested realm of surrogacy, contrasting the “baby selling” with “gift of life” rhetoric. Through these frames, this paper will compare Illinois and New Hampshire’s respective regulation of surrogacy contracts. Comparing the intended parent-friendly scheme in Illinois with the surrogate mother-friendly posture of New Hampshire law, this paper will advocate for a sensitive balance in any forthcoming Massachusetts legislation. In envisioning legislation for Massachusetts, I will argue that true protection of the surrogate can be achieved by allowing full payment to the surrogate (beyond medical expenses), and banning any post-birth termination provisions. Additionally, I will urge Massachusetts to incorporate mandatory healthcare for the surrogate, and require legal counsel for both parties to the contract. Finally, I will advocate for incentivization of “gestational surrogacy” in light of the ethical (and often religious) concerns that arise from “traditional surrogacy” arrangements. The ethical debate over surrogacy illuminates the societal forces that often stall legislation – these dilemmas are apparent in the New Hampshire and Illinois surrogacy laws. Massachusetts lawmakers can no longer punt this hotly contested issue to the courts, contributing to the patchwork of uncertain precedent for families opting for surrogacy arrangements.

By Jess Megee

Famous tales of groups implementing violent means to further their illegal business operations have shaped the common conception of organized crime in Massachusetts. In response to this type of crime, the Massachusetts legislature enacted Massachusetts General Law ch. 272, § 99 (Section 99), which authorized police to use wiretaps to investigate organized criminal activity. Section 99 substantially relies on this common conception of organized crime, only authorizing wiretaps where criminals have committed a “designated offense” in connection with “the organized criminal trade.” This standard, however, has become impracticable in the modern criminal landscape.

The issue with Section 99’s efficacy is a direct result of the type of criminal activity prevalent in Boston. Since the fall of La Cosa Nostra and Whitey Bulger’s Winter Hill Gang, an array of highly territorial “street gangs” have dominated Boston’s underworld.” Although these entities engage in many of the same criminal operations as their more famous predecessors, they do so with less clear and defined motives. The difficulty in deciphering a clear motive renders the standard for upholding single-person consent wiretaps far too exacting to investigate gang related criminal activity. In particular, Section 99 proves inadequate as a tool to investigate gang violence, which is commonly motivated by retaliation, longstanding feuds and stature in the community, rather than any pecuniary end.

By John E. Murray

Unmanned Aircraft Systems, commonly referred to as drones, have the potential to transform our lives, from providing package delivery to serving as hovering wi-fi beacons. Although drones are most often associated with surveillance in combat zones, civilian law enforcement agencies have not yet widely utilized drones for surveillance. The Supreme Court has held that civilian law enforcement agencies may use manned aircraft for surveillance without engaging in a “search” under the Fourth Amendment and may do so without a warrant. If this precedent were to apply to drone surveillance, civilian law enforcement agencies would effectively have carte blanche to conduct warrantless drone surveillance on citizens.

By Arpita Bhattacharyya

The terms “process, machine, manufacture, and composition of matter” in Section 101 of the U.S. Patent Act provide an expansive scope for patentable subject matter. To rein in this vast scope, the United States Supreme Court decreed that “laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas” are outside the ambit of patentable inventions. Thus far, the Supreme Court has failed to provide any clear rationale for such per se exclusion, except for frequently raising preemption concerns in its analysis of subject matter exclusion, thus frustrating the application of the patentable subject matter doctrine to emerging technologies, such as genetics, medical diagnostics, computer software, and business methods.

By Jeremiah W. Meyer-O’Day

In Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, the Supreme Court further restricted conditions on when unions may exact dues from agency-fee paying non-member employees. The Court’s heightened concern for the rights of employees of union shops who opt not to become members of the union contrasts with the lack of concern for the rights of dissenting shareholders in the context of corporate political advocacy. This article shows the discrepancy in the Court’s treatment of compelled speech and association seems to depend on the identity of the entity doing the compelling, and then poses questions regarding that discrepancy.

By Michael Hart

In recent years federal district courts have been inundated with a new kind of civil plaintiff known as the “copyright troll.” A plaintiff will file a claim seeking “damages for infringement upon a copyright it owns, not to be made whole, but rather as a primary or supplemental revenue stream.” Typically, these plaintiffs file a single complaint joining “tens, hundreds or thousands of individuals based on their IP addresses” for sharing a protected file across a peer-to-peer (P2P) network. Plaintiffs then move for early discovery to subpoena the identity of each Doe defendant from the service provider and send a settlement demand letter. Plaintiffs profit because some defendants feel compelled to settle rather than risk facing $150,000 in statutory damages along with court costs. Additionally, because some of the files being shared on P2P networks are pornographic films, defendants may be even more compelled to settle rather than be named as an illegal downloader of pornography. The key to all of this is large-scale joinder, that allows plaintiffs to save thousands if not millions of dollars in filing fees in order to facilitate this process.

This article discusses the use of permissive joinder in copyright troll litigation under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.