By Clare Tyler
Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (RFK Jr.) was confirmed as Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) on February 13, 2025. This occurred despite concerns regarding his nomination. Both US News and the Wall Street Journal called him “[d]angerous to [p]ublic [h]ealth.” Additionally, the American Public Health Association said that not only was RFK Jr. unqualified to run HHS but that he has shown “disregard for scientific evidence” on a wide range of issues—the most public of which has been vaccines.
One of the “yes” votes to confirm him was that of Senator Bill Cassidy of Louisiana. Senator Cassidy is a former gastroenterologist (a physician specializing in diseases of the gastrointestinal tract) and the chair of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP). He is clearly knowledgeable in the field of healthcare; that much was clear from his questioning of RFK Jr. during his confirmation hearings. Therefore, some were surprised when he voted “yes” on RFK Jr.’s nomination. When asked why he voted that way, Senator Cassidy said, “I’ve been contacted by text, by phone, by email . . . I was getting hundreds of messages a day personally and thousands through the office.” Assuming that the communications Senator Cassidy described are a reliable indicator of constituent attitudes, it seems as though he voted how his constituents wanted him to vote. However, this begs the question of whether that is his job. Should Senator Cassidy have instead exercised his judgment—as a physician and an expert in healthcare—and voted “no?” In other words, is his job to exercise his judgment, or is it to vote in response to what his constituents want? The answer is not as clear as one might think. In this essay, I will discuss the “Delegate Model” and the “Trustee Model” of Representation, theories about representation by some of the Founding Fathers, how those theories apply to the modern day, and how the Politico Model of Representation could be a compromise between the other two models.
A Delegate Model of Representation (“Delegate Model”) seems to be the dominant method of representation today. Under the “Delegate Model,” a representative is supposed to be the mouthpiece of their constituents. They vote how they are told (presumably today through the common methods of phone calls, emails, and online forums), even if they disagree with their constituents’ beliefs. On the other hand, a Trustee Model of Representation (“Trustee Model”) is when a representative, exercising their knowledge and judgment, votes in the best interest of their constituents, even if it is not how the constituents wish their representatives to vote. Senator Cassidy’s dilemma leads one to wonder whether the “Delegate Model” should be the dominant method or if the “Trustee Model” should be considered.
The best-known proponent of the “Trustee Model” was likely Edmund Burke, a Member of Parliament in Great Britain from 1765 to 1794. Burke’s famous Speech to the Electors of Bristol made clear his position:
But [the representative’s] unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living. These he does not derive from your pleasure; no, nor from the law and the constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable. Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion (emphasis added).
In essence, Burke’s position was that a representative must act in their constituents’ best interests and must use their own individual judgment to do so, even if that means not voting the way their constituents instructed. Note that Burke said that the representative owed constituents their “enlightened conscience.” The speech took place in 1774, during the Enlightenment period, a time during which intellect and curiosity were greatly valued. As such, having an intellectual representative was important during the time generally, as well as to Burke’s view of representation specifically.
The Founding Fathers had many concerns that eventually made their way into the representative democracy that we have today. The question of “Delegate Model” versus “Trustee Model” was seemingly not the main one considered by the Founders; and, if they were each pressed for an answer, they would likely have come up with a wide range.
One of the central fears the Founders had was tyranny of the majority. Alexander Hamilton was a prime example. While Hamilton at times made statements seemingly adverse to direct democracy, he still had a slight lean towards the “Delegate Model.” An example of his position was his speech at the New York Ratifying Convention. Hamilton said, “the will of the people makes the essential principle of the government. . . . They have it in their power to instruct their representatives.” While that sounds like Hamilton was promoting the “Delegate Model,” later in the same speech he went on to say that,
It has been observed by an honorable gentleman, that a pure democracy, if it were practicable, would be the most perfect government. Experience has proved that no position in politics is more false than this. The ancient democracies, in which the people themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of good government. Their very character was tyranny.
Showing apprehension toward potential tyranny of the majority, Hamilton encouraged representation as a way to prevent loud voices from certain factions silencing others.
However, Hamilton made it clear in a letter to Gouverneur Morris, another Founder and delegate to the Constitutional Convention from Pennsylvania, that people directly electing their representatives was of the utmost importance. Hamilton’s position seemed to be that representation was necessary to prevent a tyranny of the majority. Thus, he leaned toward the “Delegate Model.”
James Madison possessed a differing view. Madison leaned more towards the “Trustee Model” than Hamilton but seemed to share Hamilton’s fear of tyranny of the majority—or maybe more accurately put, a tyranny from factions. Madison, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, warned that “danger of oppression lies in the interested majorities of the people.”
In Federalist No. 10 from “The Federalist Papers,” Madison proposed multiple ways to deal with factions. He first defined a faction as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed (sic) to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” In dealing with factions, Madison explained that if a faction took the form of an overly loud minority, then relief was supplied by the “republican principle”—meaning the faction would not win enough votes to achieve their agenda. Additionally, Madison believed that the difference between a republican government and pure democracy helped solve the problem. This advantageous difference stemmed from two characteristics in his opinion. First, a republic entailed “delegation of the government,” and second, a greater number of citizens could be represented by the smaller delegation. The first characteristic of delegation meant that views must pass through the filter of the delegates before being decided upon, acting as sort of a filter.
Other ideas that Madison discussed in Federalist No. 10 were who would be chosen as representatives, the constituent-to-representative ratio, and diversity of the constituency. Given the large number of people who voted and the resulting practical need for a smaller number of delegates than constituents, Madison thought that the worthy would end up being chosen. Madison also emphasized the importance of the constituent-to-representative ratio. If the ratio was too big, then the representative would not know the interests and concerns of their constituents. If the ratio was too small, then the representative would get overly attached to their constituents and not focus on the bigger picture. The other strength of a republican government, he stated, was that a republican government was large and diverse. As such, it made factions less likely to take over since everyone had such different and competing interests. Madison seemed to lean more towards a “Trustee Model” considering his note about filtering views through the representative.
Madison’s close collaborator, Thomas Jefferson, had a slightly different opinion than both Hamilton and Madison. Out of the three, Jefferson leaned the most towards the “Delegate Model.” Jefferson wrote in his Opinion on the Treaties with France, “I consider the people who constitute a society or nation as the source of all authority in that nation . . . that all the acts done by those agents under the authority of the nation . . . are obligatory on them . . . and can in no wise be annulled or affected by any change in the form of the government, or of the persons administering it.” This notion coincides with a “Delegate Model.” Interestingly, Jefferson said in a letter to Madison that, “I think a house chosen by them [the people] will be very illy qualified to legislate for the Union, for foreign nations . . . yet this evil does not weigh against the good of preserving inviolate the fundamental principle that the people are not to be taxed but by representatives chosen immediately by themselves.” Jefferson was acknowledging that voters may not have known enough to make smart decisions, but he seemed to think it was the best method, even if it was not ideal. This thought was echoed more recently by Winston Churchill, who said, “Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others.”
In summation, Jefferson’s approach was essentially a reluctant endorsement of the “Delegate Model.” Madison’s view leaned more towards a “Trustee Model,” and Hamilton was somewhere in between, with a slight lean towards the “Delegate Model.” Jefferson’s endorsement of the “Delegate Model” seems to suggest that he trusted the common voter (or constituent) more than the representative. That approach contrasts with Madison’s filtering role of the representative but could be in keeping with Hamilton’s view. Both Jefferson and Hamilton agreed that the constituents should make a decision that is then carried out by the representative.
It appears that a republican democracy—where representatives are directly elected by the people and make decisions for the people—was the preferred method for all three mentioned Founding Fathers. They all agreed that direct election was essential to the people’s freedom. However, some of Madison’s and Hamilton’s concerns, such as factionalism and an uneducated electorate, are still with us today.
Even in today’s politics, lack of knowledge and factions ruling the conversation play into each other. With respect to RFK Jr.’s nomination, misinformed factions made their voices the loudest, and, as a result, Senator Cassidy felt that he had to vote with those interests to keep his seat. It should be noted that voting to merely keep one’s seat is a different motive than voting in constituents’ best interests.
Misinformation is so prevalent in today’s political discourse—with social media in particular—that it must be considered when discussing which model should be used. Senator Cassidy, as a physician, is more knowledgeable than many of his constituents who may more easily be persuaded by misinformation. Should he have ignored them? He likely could not have if he wanted to get re-elected. This plays perfectly into Jefferson’s line of thinking that the people are the source of authority. Constituents voting an individual into or out of an office based on how they voted on an important issue is in line with a “Delegate Model” ideal. Bill Cassidy acted under the “Delegate Model,” and in exchange, we got RFK Jr. It makes one wonder if the “Trustee Model” is the way to go.
A huge concern that the “Trustee Model” gets correct is that the average voter is not necessarily knowledgeable about how government works. RFK Jr. got a lot wrong in his nomination hearings, but it is unlikely that the average voter noticed. Does the average voter know about how Medicaid and Medicare are funded? Probably not, and they are not required to know. However, that level of knowledge was needed to understand RFK Jr.’s lack of knowledge. Bill Cassidy saw through RFK Jr., but the voters calling Cassidy did not. For the “Delegate Model” to work, the average voter needs to be just as knowledgeable as their representative. If not, a “Trustee Model” may work better. However, it is unrealistic to expect the average voter to know as much as their representative. We are not getting briefed on all government functions and funding systems, not to mention that people do not have time to read the briefs if they had them. In addition, if we establish criteria for what one is supposed to know before they go to the polls, there is the concern of a slippery slope. We already have a history of trying to decide who is informed enough to get a voice and making such a change risks sliding back into a time of oppression.
When we start talking about how the average voter is not informed enough, it is easy to recall the criticism discriminatorily targeted at certain voters historically (Black voters in particular). Examples include the requirement of literacy tests in the South before the Voting Rights Act was passed and Bill Buckley’s Why the South Must Prevail, where Buckley argued that Black people were not ready to vote. As such, any talk of one not being informed enough to vote could get problematic quite quickly. Because of all these concerns, as well as the lack of realism in expecting voters to know what our representatives know, it seems as though a purely “Delegate Model” is not the right choice.
The “Trustee Model” in an age of misinformation may seem ideal, but its problems are glaringly obvious. How do we know when a representative is voting in our interest versus when they are acting in pure self-interest? Bill Cassidy voting against RFK Jr. may represent the “Trustee Model” at its best, but what about at its worst? If we do not have all the information we should or if there is misinformation, then we still do not know if representatives have voted in the people’s interest or their own. This prevents voting from being a check on bad representatives. It seems like neither model on its own is sufficient. Thus, we require a mix. But how? The “Politico Model,” a combination of the “Delegate Model” and the “Trustee Model” could be a potential solution, but how that plays out in practice is questionable. Should a representative vote how their constituents want on some issues and use their own judgment on others? If so, how do they decide which issues to exercise judgment on and which to vote how their constituency wants?
Even if we figure out the perfect balance of the “Delegate Model” and the “Trustee Model,” there are still some remaining issues that should be addressed. First, we need better-educated voters. Not on the level that everyone is reading internal briefing memos, but at least possessing a basic understanding of the issues and an understanding of how government works. These skills would allow one to better spot misinformation. Unfortunately, we are currently severely lacking in these areas. Second, the Founders stressed the importance of fighting off factions, which continue to polarize our politics. Factions, after all, gave rise to RFK Jr.’s nomination and subsequent confirmation. Spotting misinformation and knowing how the government works would help meet the goal of preventing the rise of factions that promote and feed off misinformation. As Daniel Patrick Moynihan once said, “[e]veryone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his own facts.”
Clare Tyler is a student at Northeastern University School of Law in Boston, MA. She attended the University of Rhode Island where she graduated summa cum laude with a Bachelor’s in History. Before law school, she worked as an AmeriCorps Legal Advocate at South Coastal Counties Legal Services in New Bedford, MA. This fall, she will be a law clerk for Chief Judge John J. McConnell Jr. of the US District Court of Rhode Island.