Criminal Law

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Clemency Hearing Raises the Question of Whether Massachusetts’ Courts Are Ready to Extend the Prohibition on LWOP Sentences Beyond Eighteen

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By Stevie Leahy

In 1997, William Allen was convicted of armed robbery and felony murder and is currently serving a sentence of life without parole (“LWOP”). At the time of these crimes, Mr. Allen was twenty years old. For individuals like Mr. Allen, the executive clemency process is currently the only avenue to correct the missteps of the legal system, specifically as to sentencing under since-changed laws. The urgent need for clemency in his case raises the broader question of whether LWOP sentences for late adolescents are even constitutional under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Increased use of clemency as well as judicial action to extend the age limit are two measures that would also work toward mitigating disproportionate rates of incarceration for Black and Brown individuals within the state . . .

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Massachusetts Highest Court Mandates Parole Reform in Dinkins v. Massachusetts Parole Board

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By Lauren Watford

A major parole reform is now underway in Massachusetts after a win in Dinkins & Ivey v. Massachusetts Parole Board. Prisoners serving parole-eligible life sentences with consecutive sentences could be released years, possibly decades sooner, and will receive new parole hearings. Importantly, the Court held the Parole Board accountable for its injustices. . .

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(In)effective Assistance of Counsel in the Age of Zoom

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By Emma Coreno

I have wanted to be a litigation lawyer for as long as I can remember. I had imagined for years who my first client would be and what my first hearing or trial would look like. Was I going to feel at home in the courtroom, or would I be terrified? Would the judge and opposing counsel take me seriously? Would the client feel comfortable having a young and inexperienced student attorney represent them? I was excited for the day that I would finally have the answers to all these questions: the day that I would stand in a courtroom with my client seated next to me. At that time, little did I know that my first hearing would be entirely different than anything I had ever imagined. I already knew attorney-client relationships contained fraught power dynamics due to systemic and institutional flaws, but I was not prepared to see these relationships deteriorate so much in this new age of Zoom, to the point where I am no longer certain if there is such thing as effective assistance of counsel in a COVID world . . .

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Smartphones and Compelled Decryption: An Interview with Attorney David Rangaviz

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By David Rangaviz and Miranda Jang

Under what circumstances can a citizen be forced to unlock their smartphone for government inspection? On March 6, 2019, the Supreme Judicial Court decided Commonwealth v. Dennis Jones, in which the Court held that the government can compel a suspect to unlock their smartphone, and so disclose all of its contents, if it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect knows the passcode to the phone in question. The SJC held that the only “testimonial” aspect to an act of decryption is just the person saying that he or she knows the code to the target phone. Jones was the first decision from any state supreme court in the country to set out the constitutional rules around compelled decryption, which is one of the most significant self-incrimination issues in the digital age . . .

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UPDATE – Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Finds Doctrine of Abatement Ab Initio Outdated, Reinstates Aaron Hernandez’s Conviction

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By Monica Delateur

On April 19, 2017, former New England Patriots football player Aaron Hernandez committed suicide at the Souza-Baranowski Correctional Center outside of Boston, Massachusetts.  At the time of Hernandez’s death, the appeal of Hernandez’s conviction for the murder of Odin Lloyd was pending in front of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. This high-profile suicide sparked a debate around the doctrine of abatement ab initio, applied in Massachusetts as well as a number of states at the time of Hernandez’s death . . .

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Legislation to Watch: Abolishing Life Without Parole

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By Renna Ayyash

Seeking to continue the success of last session’s Criminal Justice Reform Act, St. 2018, c. 69, a number of currently proposed legislative bills aim to reprioritize rehabilitation, rather than punishment, in the Massachusetts’s prison system. The specific focus of this entry will be on An Act to Reduce Mass Incarceration, S.D. 533/H.D. 154, which would abolish the sentence of life without parole (LWOP), a sentence more than one in ten Massachusetts’ prisoners are serving. Ashley Nellis, Still Life: America’s Increasing Use of Life and Long-Term Sentences, The Sentencing Project (May 3, 2017). As this article hopes to illustrate, this proposed bill should be seriously considered for both pecuniary and financial reasons . . .

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In a Post-Michelle Carter World, Be Careful What You Say

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By Laurel Newman

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (SJC) recently affirmed Michelle Carter’s conviction of involuntary manslaughter for her role in the suicide of Conrad Roy. The case has been especially newsworthy since before the trial occurred, due to Ms. Carter’s indictment resting solely on spoken and written words that the Commonwealth says coerced the victim to commit suicide. As this author previously wrote, this case is the first where a defendant has been found guilty of involuntary manslaughter without doing any physical act . . .

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SCOTUS in Context: A Brief History of the ACCA Before the Court

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By Kristen Annunziato

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) of 1984 proscribes strict penalties for felons found in possession of a firearm. If the felon has a criminal record of at least three prior convictions for “violent felonies,” they are subjected to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment with a potential maximum of life behind bars for repeat offenders. 18 U.S.C.A. §924(e)(1)(West 2006); 18 U.S.C.A. §924(c)(1)(C)(ii)(West 2006). The statute, which was passed as part of the Reagan-era criminal law overhaul, has perplexed federal courts for decades. See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 195 (2007); United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2009); Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). At the heart of the multifaceted debate surrounding the act’s interpretation lies one brief question: what exactly is a violent felony? . . .

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The State of Bail in Massachusetts Following the Brangan Decision

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By M. Leonard

Bail sentencing that does not consider the financial ability of the defendant is unjust. “More than 60% across the country have not been convicted of any crime; “9 in 10 of those people are” detained solely for their inability to make bail. Cherise Fanno Burdeen, The Dangerous Domino Effect of Not Making Bail, The Atlantic (April 12, 2016). Massachusetts has long been active in incarcerating people merely for their inability to make bail, thus advocates for bail reform were excited when on August 25, 2017, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled in Brangan v. Commonwealth that judges must consider a defendant’s financial ability before setting a bail amount . . .

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Michelle Carter Conviction: Words Alone May Finally be Enough

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By Laurel Newman

In the wake of the Michelle Carter decision, many questioned how Ms. Carter’s actions amounted to involuntary manslaughter. While the facts of this case have been found to satisfy involuntary manslaughter, Carter’s actions may have been more appropriately and effectively handled by cyberbullying laws . . .

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What is abatement and why is everyone in MA talking about it? (Updated February 7, 2018)

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By Monica Delateur

With the discussion surrounding Aaron Hernandez’s conviction, acquittals, and suicide, are you wondering why there is also a discussion of abatement? Though not necessarily a new legal development, abatement could allow Hernandez’s conviction to be avoided. Read on for a quick summary . . .

21,000+ Drug Cases Dropped Due to Dookhan Scandal

By Monica Delateur

Tuesday, April 18, 2017, was the deadline for prosecutors to determine what to do about convictions impacted by the Annie Dookhan evidence-tampering scandal. Massachusetts prosecutors decided to drop more than 21,000 drug cases implicated by the scandal. The dismissal of these cases was approved by the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) on April 19th.

Physical Evidence of Certain Opioids Banned from Massachusetts Trial Courts

By Monica Delateur

The concern and devastating consequences of the Northeast’s opioid epidemic has taken an unexpected turn impacting trial courts and prosecutions. Effective January 8, 2018, substances containing any amount of fentanyl or carfentanil are banned from Massachusetts trial courthouses. Chief Justice of the Trial Court Paula Carey iterated the Trial Court‘s new policy in a memo, stating that the substances will only be allowed in the courtroom in very limited circumstances, including through a valid prescription where medical need requires use during the court day.

Post-Conviction DNA Testing in Massachusetts

By Monica Delateur

A case heard by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (SJC) on April 3, 2017, has the potential for the SJC to determine the extent of Massachusetts‘s post-conviction DNA statute Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278A.  Section 278A was passed in 2012, and as discussed in Commonwealth v. Moffat, allows a defendant to bring a post-conviction motion for DNA testing if the analysis has the potential to result in evidence material to the identification of the perpetrator of the crime in the underlying case . . .