The tension between USSF’s apparent commitment to gender equality and its labor relations with the senior women’s national team came to a boil in March 2016.11 Emboldened after winning their third World Cup title in 2015, five USWNT players filed a charge of sex discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against USSF, on behalf of themselves individually and all similarly situated USWNT players.12 The EEOC did not make a determination on the individual charges but instead issued a Notice of Right to Sue to each of the five players in February 2019.13 The following month, on International Women’s Day no less, four of those five players14 filed a class action lawsuit against USSF on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated USWNT players. They brought suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, alleging violations of the Equal Pay Act (EPA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for unequal pay and unequal working conditions based on their sex.15 While the EEOC charges were still pending, the USWNT and USSF signed a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in 2017.16 The new CBA provided better travel accommodations and per diems equal to the USMNT, along with guaranteed salaries and other benefits not afforded to the USMNT.17 The USWNT players, however, felt the CBA had not fully resolved their EEOC complaint and proceeded with the lawsuit.18 Four months after filing the equal pay lawsuit against its federation, the USWNT won its fourth Women’s World Cup.19 As the final whistle blew, the cacophony of cheers and applause quickly gave way to chants of “equal pay” from the raucous crowd.20 The chants also greeted the players throughout their post-World Cup celebrations, from the ticker-tape parade in New York City21 to the Victory Tour friendly—non-competitive—matches played in cities across the U.S.22
The USWNT’s success on the field, however, did not translate to success in court. On May 1, 2020, the district court granted in part USSF’s motion for summary judgment, finding the USWNT failed to establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination.23 Due to the difficulty comparing the rates of pay under the fundamentally different structures of the men’s and women’s CBAs, the potential for the USMNT to earn significantly more revenue in FIFA prize money, and the give-and-take bargaining history between the parties, the USWNT is unlikely to prevail on appeal.24 However, public sentiment remains firmly on its side, providing leverage to achieve a favorable settlement with the Federation. USSF itself has indicated such a settlement is likely despite the favorable outcome in court.25 The New York Times noted, in the wake of the summary judgment decision, “[t]he seemingly endless battles with its most popular players have unquestionably damaged—and continue to damage—U.S. Soccer’s reputation.”26
This article examines the equal pay dispute between the two parties and argues why and how USSF should adopt an equal pay standard as a matter of policy. Part I provides an overview of the dispute, framing it as a larger policy argument between the parties, and presents a comparison of the two collective bargaining agreements at issue and the history of FIFA’s disparate prize money awards. Part II looks at the EPA itself, including its purposes and limitations in ensuring equal work is rewarded with equal pay. Part III dissects and analyzes the district court’s summary judgment decision. Part IV then shifts to a policy discussion and argues the nonprofit missions of USSF and FIFA mandate equal pay for women’s soccer players. And finally, Part V considers how the USWNT can leverage its victory in the court of public opinion, despite its loss in a court of law, to settle with USSF and makes specific recommendations to resolve the dispute, informed by the preceding analysis.
In response, USSF maintained that the USWNT was actually paid more than the USMNT during the five-year class period from 2015 to 2019, both in total compensation and on a per-game basis.40 During 2016 negotiations, USSF offered the USWNT the same pay-to-play proposal as the USMNT but with lower per-game fees for friendlies and lower bonuses for both friendlies and World Cup play.41 USSF admitted its offer did not include these terms because it was an intentionally low opening offer, the USWNT has historically generated less revenue than the USMNT from friendlies, and the USMNT has the potential to earn significantly higher prize money from the FIFA World Cup.42 The two sides ended up with what USSF described as a hybrid contract that includes guaranteed salaries for some players, flat fee appearances for others, and performance bonuses for both types of players.43 Most importantly, USSF argued the 2017 CBA had paid the USWNT over $25 million in the ensuing three years, 2.5 times as much as the $11 million the USMNT’s CBA had paid during that same period.44 The 2017 USWNT CBA provides several contract terms not present in the current USMNT CBA, including a six-figure salary guaranteed regardless of play; salary continuation during periods of injury; paid health insurance benefits; paid childcare assistance; paid pregnancy and parental leave; severance benefits; retirement benefits; bonuses tied to increased television ratings, sponsorship revenue, and ticket sales; over $1 million per year for players’ National Women’s Soccer League (NWSL)45 salaries; a $230,000 signing bonus paid directly to the twenty-three players on the roster ($10,000 each) when the CBA was executed; and an annual $350,000 payment to the players’ union in exchange for rights to the players’ images and likenesses.46 USSF argued that even taking out the NWSL salaries, money allocated to the union, and other benefits, the USWNT received roughly $6 million more than the USMNT over the past five years.47
USSF also argued that if any pay differential between the national teams existed, it was based on two factors unrelated to sex: (1) a good-faith belief the USMNT had generated and would continue to generate more revenue and profit for the Federation primarily due to the huge difference in potential FIFA prize money; and (2) terms and trade-offs negotiated by two different unions during the course of collective bargaining.48 The basic structure of each team’s collective bargaining agreement and FIFA’s history of prize money disparity are explored in the following sections.
Both the USMNT and USWNT players’ unions expected the USWNT’s 2017 CBA negotiations to result in dramatic increases in USWNT compensation on par with USSF’s substantial increases in revenue since the two teams last negotiated their respective collective bargaining agreements.56 “Instead, the women’s 2017–2021 CBA did not bring the women equality in working conditions and the women did not benefit from the dramatic increase in revenue associated with the USWNT.”57 The USMNT further argues that the deal USWNT ended up with was worse financially than the USMNT’s 2011 CBA, negotiated six years prior and in its final year before expiration.58 By insisting on this mark of comparison, the USMNT’s union contends, USSF showed it had no intention of fairly compensating the female players.59 A comparative analysis of the 2017 USWNT CBA and the expired-yet-still-in-effect 2011 USMNT remains necessary to arrive at an acceptable settlement, as all of the legal arguments put forth by both sides are based on that comparison, and the USMNT has not yet agreed to a new CBA with USSF.
Like the non-contract USWNT players, the male players generally must be on the USMNT roster to be eligible for compensation from USSF, albeit at significantly higher rates.68 However, the USMNT CBA also provides reduced training camp compensation amounts for friendly matches for players who were invited to training camp but did not make the roster for the match or matches associated with that camp.69 USSF pays the USMNT players through appearance fees and bonuses, as detailed in the next section.
Neither USSF nor the USWNT has offered any explanation as to why the players’ NWSL club salaries are negotiated within the same agreement as their national team compensation. However, it is worth noting that the same party (USSF) controls both the players’ national team and club team livelihoods. The 2017 USWNT CBA notably prohibits the players from strikes and lockouts during the term of the agreement, a five-year period that runs from January 1, 2017, to December 31, 2021.80 Perhaps, as the USMNT union postulated, the resulting unequal bargaining position left the members of the USWNT no reasonable alternative but to accept the compensation terms offered by USSF.81
FIFA is the governing body of world soccer.84 It is comprised of 211 member national associations divided into six regional confederations.85 The U.S. Soccer Federation is a member of the Confederation of North, Central America, and Caribbean Association Football, widely known by its acronym CONCACAF.86 FIFA is a nonprofit organization with a three-pillar mission: (1) “to develop the game [of soccer] everywhere and for all[;]” (2) “to touch the world through a wide range of competitions[;]” and (3) “to build a better future through [soccer].”87 FIFA acknowledges it accomplishes these goals through the revenue generated from the men’s World Cup, played every four years.88 A report issued by FIFA in February 2020 notes over $6 billion in revenue from the 2015–2018 cycle and pledges to invest $4 billion in “development and education,” $1 billion in women’s soccer, and $500 million in the development of soccer infrastructure by 2022.89
According to FIFA data, over 3.5 billion people watched the most recent World Cup held in Russia in 2018.90 Each of the sixty-four matches averaged a live audience of 191 million, and the final attracted an audience of 1.12 billion people around the world.91 FIFA data also shows the most recent Women’s World Cup held in France in 2019 was watched by over a billion people, making it the most-watched tournament in its relatively short twenty-eight-year history.92 The final was also the most-watched match in Women’s World Cup history, with a total audience of over 263 million.93 Each match averaged an audience of over 17 million viewers, more than double the per-match average audience from the 2015 Women’s World Cup.94 In contrast, 99.9 million people tuned into Super Bowl LIV in 2020.95
With both the World Cup and the Women’s World Cup steadily growing in overall and per-game worldwide viewership, the prize money has also increased.96 The table below shows a comparison of the total and per-team prize money available in the 2018 World Cup97 and the 2019 Women’s World Cup.98
On the women’s side, these figures are double what was available in the previous Women’s World Cup.99 Despite this increase, the women’s prize money remains substantially lower than the men’s prizes.100 The total prize money for the 2019 Women’s World Cup was just 7.5% of the men’s total, resulting in a difference in payment of $370 million.101 The USWNT received just above 10% of what the French men’s national team received for winning the entire tournament in 2018 and half of what male teams receive for not even making it out of the World Cup’s opening group stage. These numbers do not align with the differentials in viewership for the two tournaments. According to the FIFA viewership data described above, the total viewership of the 2019 Women’s World Cup was about 34% of the 2018 World Cup total audience, and the 2019 final-match audience was just under 22% of the audience tuning into the men’s final.
In response to FIFA’s announcement that it would double the prize money for the 2019 Women’s World Cup, international players union Fédération Internationale des Associations de Footballeurs Professionnels, commonly known as FIFPRO, criticized the measure.102 While the prize money for the women grew, the men’s prize money also increased such that the difference between the two tournaments’ financial rewards grew even greater.103 The gap between the prize for winning the women’s versus the men’s tournament went from $33 million104 in the previous World Cup cycle to $34 million.105 A statement issued by the union noted: “This regressive trend appears to contravene FIFA’s statutory commitment to gender equality.”106 Unions representing players in Australia, Norway, Sweden, and New Zealand have written to FIFA to protest the comparatively small gains, urging the governing body to move towards pay equality.107 The Professional Footballers Australia union contends even if the total women’s prize money continues to increase by 100% every four years, as it has done over the last two cycles, it will take until 2039 to achieve pay equality with the men’s prize money, assuming it continues to grow at the same 12% rate.108 FIFA President Gianni Infantino has conceded that critics of the prize money structure are “perfectly justified” and “have a ‘fair point’” but characterized the increase in the women’s prize total as one of many steps.109
USSF maintains it has “for years” lobbied FIFA for increased Women’s World Cup prize money and “continues to do so[.]”110 However, it also must be noted the Federation stands to gain substantial revenue by securing increased prize money for the women. As former Federation president Sunil Gulati noted, USSF refused to provide equal World Cup bonuses not just because of the significant differences in prize money but because it was more likely to have to actually pay the USWNT for a successful tournament performance.111
A. An Introduction to the EPA and Its Goal to Ensure Equal Work Is Rewarded with Equal Wages
The EPA prohibits employers from compensating employees differently, on the basis of sex, for equal work in jobs that require “equal skill, effort, and responsibility . . . performed under similar working conditions[.]”117 There are four exemptions—three specific and one catchall—that allow disparate wages for employees of different sexes. These exemptions apply where such payments are made pursuant to “(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any factor other than sex.”118 The plaintiff bears the burden of proof to establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination.119 Specifically, plaintiffs at this stage must show they: (1) were paid less than coworkers of the opposite sex; (2) performed substantially equal work; and (3) carried out the work under similar working conditions.120 One scholar has noted that “the prima facie standard under the EPA is defined in broad terms and requires an intricate factual examination of the compared jobs to determine whether the performance of the work requires substantially ‘equal skill, effort, and responsibility.’”121 Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the defendant to show the differential is justified by one of the four affirmative defenses enumerated in the Act.122 Each of the prima facie elements and the catchall exception are explained in the following subsections.
Courts have generally held that total remuneration is not the proper basis for comparing wages.126 The Sixth Circuit has noted that the EPA “commands an equal rate of pay for equal work . . . [and the c]omparison of pay rates entails measuring the amount of pay against a common denominator, typically a given time period or quantity or quality of output.”127 As a result, courts must identify the proper factor to measure pay rates.128 “This must be a practical inquiry which looks to the nature of the services for which an employer in fact compensates an employee.”129 In some circumstances, however, total remuneration may be an appropriate measure, provided that a plaintiff’s total compensation is not more than her comparator’s solely by virtue of working more.130 For example, one district court found a plaintiff had not established a valid EPA claim despite receiving a smaller weekly salary than her male coworkers because, when her insurance benefits were factored in, she received greater total compensation than her comparators.131
By far, the most commonly asserted defense is the catchall defense claiming pay differentials are based on a factor other than sex.143 A study of 500 district court EPA cases decided between 2000 and 2011 found that employers typically offer a laundry list of reasons to justify their pay disparities.144 The most commonly asserted factors “other than sex” were the length of service (informal seniority); qualifications in terms of experience, education, or performance; market forces or business judgment; and prior or negotiated salaries.145 The regulations do not specify what constitutes a reason other than sex, but they do note that the comparative average cost of employing one sex as a group does not qualify as a pay differential based on a factor other than sex.146 The regulations also state that collective bargaining agreements are not a defense.147 However, in practice, courts defer to the bargaining process itself and tend not to address the regulation prohibiting the use of collective bargaining agreements as an EPA claim defense.148 As described below, the district court in Morgan v. U.S. Soccer Federation focused largely on the bargaining history of the two parties before ultimately finding the USWNT was not paid less than the USMNT over the class period when looking at total compensation rather than the rate of pay. Although the USWNT argued the collective bargaining agreement could not be used as a defense by USSF and cited the regulation, the district court did not address this point in its decision.
The study of district court decisions noted that summary judgment for employers was granted on the vast majority of EPA cases, largely regardless of the judge’s political ideology or sex or the geographic location of the court.154 The author of the study identified the strict interpretation of the prima facie equal work standard, and the liberal application of the “any factor other than sex” defense as the key barriers to trial for EPA claims.155 The author noted:
[While the] prima facie standard under the EPA is defined in broad terms and requires an intricate factual examination of the compared jobs to determine whether the performance of the work requires substantially equal “skill, effort, and responsibility[,]” . . . some courts have required strict identity among compared jobs or imposed their own vision of “equal work” without applying the EPA’s regulatory definitions.156
Of the 500 decisions studied, 49% found the plaintiff failed to establish the prima facie equal work element.157
Most of these decisions offered very little, if any, analysis of the equal work standard.158 Out of the relatively small number of claims found to satisfy the prima facie standard (185 out of 500), the court denied summary judgment for employers in 144, or 79%, of such cases.159 “This is an important finding because most legislative proposals to amend the EPA focus on narrowing the statute’s defenses, not modernizing the prima facie standard.”160 However, because a significant majority of equal pay claims are lost at the prima facie level, courts typically never even reach the merits of the asserted defenses.161 Ultimately, the study argues that juries, rather than district court judges, should be making factual judgments about whether jobs are substantially equal.162 The next section explores how the district court in Morgan v. U.S. Soccer Federation resolved the summary judgment motions filed by both parties in line with the majority of cases reviewed in the study.
A. How the District Court Disposed of the USWNT’s EPA Claim
As noted in Part I, Section A, the USWNT argued that the written terms of its CBA established that its players were paid at a rate less than the USMNT players based on (1) a lower bonus structure than what is available under the men’s CBA and (2) their expert’s report that the female players would have received more under the men’s CBA than they did under their own CBA, even taking into account the fringe benefits not afforded to the male players.167 USSF argued it actually paid the USWNT more than the USMNT during the class period both in total compensation ($24 million compared to $18 million) and on a per-game basis ($220,747 per game and $212,639 per game, respectively).168 The USWNT contended total compensation was the inappropriate method of comparing the two teams’ wages, based on arguments the district court had already decided in an earlier phase of the case.169
At the class certification stage, the district court rejected USSF’s argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the four class representatives individually made more money than the highest-paid USMNT player during the class period.170 In rejecting this argument, Judge Gary Klausner noted it “presuppos[ed] that there [could] be no discrimination under either Title VII or the EPA where a female employee’s total [annual] compensation exceeded that of similarly-situated males, regardless of whether the female receiv[ed] a lower rate of pay than her male comparators.”171 To hold otherwise, he explained, could lead to an “absurd result” where a woman paid at half the rate of a male coworker receives equal compensation solely by virtue of working twice as many hours.172 Despite the USWNT’s characterization of USSF’s total compensation argument as an attempt to relitigate the court’s certification order, the court noted it could not conclude at the class certification stage that discrimination had not occurred based solely on the fact that some USWNT received greater total compensation than USMNT players without further evidence that the female players were not paid more by virtue of working more.173 Instead, the district court found the plaintiffs had the burden of showing what evidence they had developed on this point at the summary judgment stage and did not satisfy this burden.174 The court pointed to the “undisputed” evidence that, during the class period, the USWNT played 111 games and made $24.5 million in total compensation, averaging $220,747 per game, whereas the USMNT played 87 games and made $18.5 million in total compensation with an average of $212,639 per game.175 “Based on this evidence, it appears that the [US]WNT did not make more money than the [US]MNT solely because they played more games. Rather, the [US]WNT both played more games and made more money than the [US]MNT per game. Under these circumstances, it is not ‘absurd’ to consider the total compensation received by the players.”176
In wrapping up its analysis of the EPA claim, the district court addressed the plaintiffs’ two primary arguments as to how the USWNT CBA established a lower pay rate than the USMNT CBA. With respect to the lower bonus structure in the USWNT CBA, the court emphasized that focusing on the bonuses in isolation ignored the other compensatory benefits the players received under the terms of the CBA in contravention of the EPA, which requires all forms of compensation, including fringe benefits, to be considered wages.177 As to the argument that the USWNT would have been paid more under the USMNT CBA, the district court pointed to the history of negotiations between the parties in finding untenable the comparison of what each team would have made under the other’s CBA because it “ignores the reality that [each team] bargained for different agreements which reflect different preferences, and that the [US]WNT explicitly rejected the terms they now seek to retroactively impose on themselves.”178 Judge Klausner found this evidence, taken together, was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial, thereby declining to address the remaining elements of the prima facie claim and granting summary judgment to USSF on the USWNT’s EPA claim.
The district court found that in terms of total and per-game compensation, the USWNT had been paid more than the USMNT during the five-year class period. In so finding, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ arguments that lower bonuses made their rate of pay lower and that they would have received more compensation under the terms of the USMNT CBA because the players’ union bargained for their guaranteed contract terms. However, the court failed to acknowledge that the five-year class period included two World Cups for the women in 2015 and 2019, both of which they won, and only one World Cup for the men in 2018, for which they failed to even qualify. The prize money available to the winner of the Women’s World Cup is less than the prize money FIFA pays to men’s national teams for qualifying for the World Cup.179 The Federation admitted it had these historical revenue differentials in mind when it negotiated USWNT performance bonuses related to the 2015 and 2019 Women’s World Cups.180 It conceded that paying the USWNT equal bonuses for Word Cup play would “break” the Federation financially without receiving “concomitant prize money.”181 As a result, USSF rejected the USWNT union’s demand for equal bonuses during the 2016 contract negotiations.182 In a declaration regarding his involvement in CBA negotiations attached to USSF’s summary judgment filing, former Federation president Sunil Gulati stated:
One thing I do know is that I never would have authorized offering or accepting, and never would have recommended to the Board agreeing to, the same bonuses for Women’s World Cup play that were contained in the [US]MNT’s agreement for their World Cup play for very simple reasons. I believed the [US]WNT was much more likely to qualify for and succeed in their tournament than the [US]MNT was, and I believed that the [US]MNT’s participation and success in their tournament would result in the receipt of substantially more prize money from FIFA than the [US]WNT’s participation and success in their tournament.183
These facts are undisputed, and yet the district court failed to address them in concluding the USWNT received more compensation than the USMNT. The women’s team may not have had to work more to earn greater total and per-game compensation than their male counterparts, but they certainly had to be more successful.184
The court also provided no analysis of the USWNT’s expert’s assessment of wages. After reviewing the bargaining history between the parties since 2012, the court simply dismissed the USWNT’s expert opinion that the players would have received more money under the USMNT, even taking into account the fringe benefits not provided to the men, because “the [US]WNT explicitly rejected the terms they now seek to retroactively impose on themselves.”185 However, the undisputed facts show the USWNT did not reject the terms of the USMNT CBA. Instead, they rejected the same pay-to-play structure that offered lower bonuses and appearance fees than what is provided to the men.186 When it became clear that USSF was not going to agree to the same level of compensation for the USWNT under a pay-to-play model, the union shifted its priorities to try to secure other guaranteed compensation and benefits for the players. While courts are hesitant to interfere with the bargaining process in labor negotiations, it is an inaccurate characterization of the facts to say the USWNT explicitly rejected the terms of the USMNT CBA. Where, as here, the two labor agreements being compared are so fundamentally different, the hypothetical scenario outlined by the USWNT expert is useful.187 If both teams played and won twenty friendly matches under their respective CBAs, the USMNT players would earn $263,320 ($13,166 per game), and the USWNT players would receive a maximum of $99,000 ($4,950 per game), 38% of the male players’ earnings.188
Even if the court had considered these facts and determined the USWNT established a prima facie EPA claim—assuming the other two elements are met—the players still may not have survived the summary judgment hurdle. As the study reviewed in Section B of Part II notes, courts tend to liberally apply the “any factor other than sex” defense in considering summary judgment motions on EPA claims. Here, USSF points to both revenue and collective bargaining as two non-sex-based factors for any pay disparity between its men’s and women’s senior national teams.189 While the court did not explicitly evaluate these defenses in finding the plaintiffs failed to establish the necessary prima facie element of lesser pay, it indicated support for USSF’s position by citing the parties’ bargaining history to reject the USWNT’s approach to comparing the compensation of the two teams, noting the players were willing to forgo higher bonuses for other benefits.190 As a result, it seems likely that the court would have granted summary judgment for the Federation even if it had found the USWNT established a prima facie case of wage discrimination under the EPA.
The fact-intensive nature of the court’s analysis and findings, however, suggests the case should have proceeded to trial to allow the jury to serve its role as trier-of-fact. A reasonable jury could look at the history of labor negotiations and determine that USSF’s control of both the national team and league salaries put the USWNT in an unequal bargaining position. Or, a reasonable jury could agree with the court’s assessment that the USWNT’s rejection of the pay-to-play structure and higher bonuses to secure guaranteed benefits makes the team’s approach to compensation comparison untenable. The point, as noted by the study of district court EPA summary judgment decisions, is that district court judges should not be making these “factual judgment calls.”191 However, whether on appeal or before a hypothetical jury, the USWNT appears unlikely to prevail on its EPA claims for three reasons: (1) the compensation structures of the USWNT and USMNT are so fundamentally different they are nearly impossible to compare to determine whether USSF has, in fact, paid the women at a lesser rate than the men; (2) differences in revenue generation, including FIFA prize money, is likely an acceptable non-sex-based factor in USSF’s compensation decisions; and (3) the players negotiated, through give and take, the terms of their agreement through the collective bargaining process, which courts tend to prefer not to interfere with. For each of these reasons, in addition to the general propensity of district courts to grant summary judgment in favor of employers in EPA cases, an EPA lawsuit was likely not the most effective weapon the USWNT could have chosen to fight its battle for equal pay.
FIFA promotes the development of women’s football and pledges to support women’s football financially and to give players, coaches, referees and officials the opportunity to become actively involved in football. FIFA is helping to popularise the game by increasing public awareness and conducting information campaigns as well as overcoming social and cultural obstacles for women with the ultimate aim of improving women’s standing in society.193
Included with this mission statement is a list of objectives to achieve the goals stated therein.194 Specifically, FIFA states it will work to: ensure that every girl and woman who wants to play soccer has the opportunity to do so; help member associations to overcome the main challenges of developing women’s soccer; promote opportunities for women, both on and off the pitch; involve more former female players; have more quality top-level female coaches; help build sustainable professional national and regional women’s soccer competitions at various levels; constantly improve the quality, organization, and expansion of women’s soccer competitions; and encourage the promotion and marketing of women’s soccer at all levels to grow participation, build a bigger audience, and target potential partners.195
In addition to these broader goals, FIFA has identified the acceleration of women’s soccer as one of its eleven goals to accomplish its vision for 2020–2023.196 “Bolstering the women’s game, as well as the participation of women in football governance at all levels, is at the top of the game’s agenda around the world.”197 To support these efforts, FIFA plans to reform competitions, including introducing additional regular global women’s competitions; modernize programs aimed at developing women’s soccer in a way that is tailored to the specificities of the women’s game; and create programs and policies that put women in a position to succeed on the pitch and assume global soccer leadership positions.198 Significantly, FIFA also sets out to enhance the commercial value of women’s soccer through the evolution of FIFA’s commercial program, “taking into consideration the specific needs of the women’s game, whose distinct brand identity should be created and underpinned by an innovative digital strategy.”199 FIFA expects the prioritization of these initiatives to further boost the commercial value of women’s soccer.200
Undeniably, USSF’s support of women’s soccer and the USWNT has put the team in a position to achieve unparalleled success in the women’s game. In its motion for summary judgment, USSF noted that star USWNT player Megan Rapinoe had even acknowledged the Federation was deserving of “a tremendous amount of credit” for “back[ing] the team in a very strong way” and “push[ing] the game” in the U.S. and abroad.204 Despite the evident support of women’s soccer by both FIFA and USSF, the significant pay disparity between male and female players remains. As the women’s game has grown in the U.S. and around the world, so have the rallying cries for equal pay.
By not making the prize money equal, FIFA has essentially enabled its member associations to not pay their women’s national team players equally, which stunts the overall development of the women’s game. The lack of parity beyond the top ten or so ranked teams in women’s soccer is on display during every CONCACAF World Cup and Olympic qualifying tournament.207 Most recently, the USWNT cruised through the tournament to qualify for the 2020 (now 2021) Tokyo Summer Olympics.208 The disparity in the level of play was most stark during the USWNT’s opening match against an inexperienced and ultimately defenseless Thailand in the 2019 Women’s World Cup, which resulted in a 13-0 victory for the Americans.209 Notably, the Thai women’s national team, which was playing in its first Women’s World Cup, is supported by a wealthy patron, the chief executive of one of the country’s largest insurance companies, who also serves as its general manager.210 The family insurance company sponsors Thailand’s women’s league and employs women’s national team players.211 The USWNT was roundly criticized for continuing to press for goals despite the match being well out of hand for the Thai team.212 In response, USWNT player Alex Morgan stated her hope that the tournament would expand to thirty-two teams and that the dramatic loss would “encourage[] FIFA to put a bit of pressure on those respective federations to put more efforts into their women’s sides.”213
While the USWNT has received considerable support from its federation in comparison to many women’s national teams around the world, its own success in relation to the rest of the field of teams is what has put it in the position to demand equal pay. The relative lack of on-field success of the USMNT only amplifies the unique message of the USWNT players. As discussed in Section A of Part I above, one of USSF’s core arguments in justifying any wage differential between the two teams is its inability to provide the equal fees and bonuses requested by the USWNT because the women’s team has historically generated less revenue for friendlies and is eligible for far less FIFA prize money than the USMNT. However, the Federation’s resistance to the USWNT’s equal pay overtures and its disastrous “inherent inferiority” legal arguments, described in Section A of Part V, below, have ultimately made the USWNT more commercially viable. A report in the Wall Street Journal noted the rise in marketing deals centered on equality for women as evidence that “the U.S. women’s equal pay-fight has spurred more marketing deals with the federation.”214 The USWNT home jersey, in which the players secured the team’s fourth World Cup title, became the bestselling soccer jersey for men or women ever sold on the retailer’s website in one season.215 Nike struggled to meet the demand for the jersey following the World Cup.216
Perhaps most significantly, an act of protest by the USWNT led to sales of a t-shirt that set a single-day record for the company that produced it, despite going on sale just one hour and forty-three minutes before the end of the day.217 After legal filings became public in which USSF contended USWNT players did not perform equal work to USMNT players because they “inherently had less skill, ability and responsibility than men’s players[,]” the USWNT players appeared for their next game (just two days later) wearing their pregame warm-up shirts inside out, hiding everything but the outline of the U.S. Soccer crest and, more significantly, the four stars representing the team’s four World Cup wins.218 T-shirts bearing the “4 Stars Only” empty crest went on sale that same night through a company called BreakingT, which has a licensing agreement with the USWNT players’ union.219 Sports Illustrated reporter Grant Wahl noted this “viral business opportunity” was “the perfect symbolism, a way to show the abject emptiness of the U.S. Soccer Federation while still honoring the players who have led the U.S. to its greatest soccer triumphs.”220
It should be noted, however, that an argument for equal pay among national teams is not an argument that salaries for men and women employed by the same clubs should be equal. Those clubs do not have nonprofit purposes to consider and can make compensation decisions purely driven by revenue generation and potential. Former Ballon d’Or221 winner Ada Hegerberg, arguably the best player in the sport, is the highest-paid women’s soccer player in the world, earning an annual salary of around $562,000 (with bonuses) from her club, Olympique Lyonnais.222 That figure is significantly higher than the highest salaries awarded to players in the other prominent women’s soccer leagues around the world, including, notably, the U.S.223 It is also roughly 326 times less than what male superstar Lionel Messi is paid by his club, FC Barcelona.224 However, it is notable that the clubs that pay the highest women’s salaries are affiliated with successful men’s soccer clubs. These salary figures are dwarfed by the top men’s club salaries, but they show how an infusion of revenue generated by men’s soccer can help make women’s soccer more commercially successful. They also show how important national team compensation is to women players who do not receive the benefit of high club salaries.
Ultimately, the nonprofit missions of both FIFA and its member federations will be better served by making equal pay the standard in women’s national team compensation. That investment should, in turn, increase revenue generated by women’s soccer at both the national team and club level.
In early March 2020, when both parties filed oppositions to the other party’s motion for summary judgment, USSF’s filing garnered intense scrutiny.227 Up to that point, USSF’s arguments, both in court and publicly, had largely centered on revenue disparities between the two teams, flagging the huge difference in FIFA prize money as the primary culprit of any pay wage gap. However, the Federation controversially asserted that the jobs of male and female soccer players are not equal because women are inherently physically inferior.228 The filing explicitly stated, “[t]he overall soccer-playing ability required to compete at the senior men’s national team level is materially influenced by the level of certain physical attributes, such as speed and strength, required for the job.”229
As media reports dissected these ostensibly sexist arguments, USSF sponsors like Coca-Cola, Budweiser, Visa, and Deloitte began speaking out against the Federation.230 Volkswagen issued a statement declaring it was “disgusted” by U.S. Soccer’s “unacceptable” positions, noting “[w]e stand with the USWNT and the ideals they represent for the world, [and] [w]e demand that U.S. Soccer rise up to these values.”231 The next day, USSF President, Carlos Cordeiro, issued a statement apologizing for the legal strategy and taking responsibility for not having reviewed the filing before its submission.232 Cordiero’s statement was ironically issued during the waning moments of the USWNT’s final game in the She Believes Cup,233 an annual four-team, round-robin tournament hosted by U.S. Soccer to provide the USWNT a regular opportunity to play against elite competition.234 Megan Rapinoe, arguably the most famous women’s soccer star in the world, responded to Cordeiro’s statement live at the conclusion of ESPN’s broadcast of the game, issuing an impromptu, impassioned statement of her own:
To every girl out there, to every boy out there, who watches this team, who wants to be on this team or just wants to live their dream out, you are not lesser just because you are a girl. You are not better just because you are a boy. We are all created equal and should have the equal opportunity to go out and pursue our dreams.235
The following evening, three days after the controversial filing, Cordeiro resigned.236 Cindy Parlow Cone, USSF Vice President and former USWNT player, then became the Federation’s first female president, and the Federation hired new legal counsel.237
Collectively, these events tremendously weakened USSF’s already precarious position in the court of public opinion.238 The Federation’s victory in court is not enough to repair its damaged reputation. With new leadership and a new legal team in place, USSF seems primed to settle this case.239 However, the industry-wide shutdown of live crowds at sports events due to the COVID-19 pandemic has severely impacted USSF’s revenue, prompting layoffs and other cost-saving measures that may hinder its ability to offer a settlement that will satisfy the USWNT.240 Despite this unforeseen complication, the longer this case drags out, the stronger the public support for the USWNT appears to be growing.241 As the two sides presumably work behind the scenes to reach an acceptable settlement before the surviving Title VII claim on unequal working conditions goes to trial, this article recommends specific measures the parties can take to resolve the equal pay dispute and enter into a new collective bargaining agreement.
The scathing statement issued by the USMNT union about the USWNT’s 2017 CBA notes that the USWNT union typically negotiated their CBA after the men and describes how the two unions have worked together since 1999 with the goal of securing gains in pay and working conditions comparable to the men for the women.250 However, the women negotiated their 2017 CBA towards the end of the USMNT’s 2011 CBA, making it easier for USSF to compare the USWNT’s proposed compensation to figures agreed to by the USMNT union in 2010.251 Thus, having two separate unions not only dilutes the bargaining power of both teams it makes revenue and compensation comparisons nearly impossible, presenting a significant hindrance to the efforts to achieve equal pay. The USWNT and USMNT should form one players’ association, like the Norwegian union, in order to have access to the same USSF financial figures at the same moment in time and bargain with USSF together. Doing so will give both teams a stronger, more informed bargaining position and make it more difficult for USSF to use the USMNT’s compensation against the USWNT in negotiations. Perhaps it will also result in a more similar compensation structure so that the two teams could better analyze their relative equality. In a recent L.A. Times op-ed, soccer journalist Grant Wahl advocated for this joint-bargaining structure, noting that “[t]he two . . . teams would have more leverage together, especially with the threat of a double-barreled work stoppage heading into 2022, when the men’s World Cup is scheduled.”252 Wahl also noted that bargaining together would not require the teams to secure the exact same compensation terms, but instead would give them the opportunity to “creatively determin[e] what they view as ‘equal pay,’ while maintaining strict equity on apples-to-apples comparisons, such as travel support.”253
USSF should allow separate sponsors for each senior national team. There can still be larger joint sponsors that support both teams as well as other USSF properties, but allowing individual team sponsors will provide U.S. Soccer with a more accurate reflection of the revenue each team is generating when making compensation decisions. The USWNT has demonstrated its commercial viability independent of the USMNT, particularly in the aftermath of the 2019 Women’s World Cup, and it should be rewarded for that success.
Recent increases in outside investment in the league suggest U.S. Soccer may step back from its role in subsidizing national team player salaries.258 In January 2020, the ownership group of French soccer club Olympique Lyonnais, which operates successful men’s and women’s club teams, acquired an 89.5% operating stake of the NWSL team based in the Seattle area.259 More recently, in July 2020, the NWSL announced an expansion team in Los Angeles beginning in 2022.260 The team, tentatively referred to as Angel City, is owned by more than thirty people, the vast majority of whom are women.261 Notable owners include actresses Natalie Portman, Jennifer Garner, Eva Longoria, Jessica Chastain, and Uzo Aduba; Mia Hamm, Abby Wambach, Julie Foudy, Lauren Holiday, and other former national team players; and Serena Williams, her tech entrepreneur husband Alexis Ohanian, and their two-year-old daughter Olympia.262 In an interview with the New York Times, club president Julie Uhrman noted part of the owners’ mission in investing in the team was “embracing the fight for pay equity for women [athletes] by bolstering media coverage of the league, securing new sponsorships and, ultimately, creating stronger revenue streams through increased viewership.”263 With such high-profile ownership, Angel City FC earned an estimated $31 million media value across media platforms without spending anything on marketing.264 If this early interest is an indication of future success, it will bolster the value of the entire league and help the players achieve the kind of financial security male national players enjoy through their respective club contracts.
As a matter of policy, however, USSF, FIFA, and other national federations should adopt an equal pay standard.266 Equal pay is an essential component in developing and growing the game of women’s soccer around the world. It is an investment in women—in their skill and competitive spirit—that has the potential to yield substantial returns for FIFA and its national member associations in the form of increased ticket sales, TV ratings, and sponsorships. Not only does it make economic sense, but it also furthers the well-documented nonprofit missions of FIFA, USSF, and the other national federations. The growth and development of women’s soccer are essential to these organizations’ charitable purposes precisely because the game provides an opportunity to positively impact women’s freedom and equality, which are still restricted in many parts of the world. As one writer noted, human rights are not “separate from women’s soccer[;]” they are “a defining aspect.”267 No matter the final outcome of the USWNT’s lawsuit against USSF, these arguments for investing in women’s soccer remain firm.
Unfortunately, while both FIFA and USSF were in a strong financial position to make moves toward equal pay before the COVID-19 pandemic, the industry-wide shutdown of all sports across the world has cost both of these entities a significant amount in projected 2020 revenue and beyond.268 One analysis estimated the sudden shutdown of the sports industry would wipe out at least $12 billion in expected revenue.269 That’s in the U.S. alone, and that’s the economic reality both USSF and the USWNT will be facing as they negotiate a settlement to resolve their equal pay dispute. There were no easy answers pre-COVID, given the fundamentally different structures of the USMNT and USWNT compensation packages. Resolution now becomes more difficult as the full extent of the pandemic’s impact on the world economy remains unknown. What is known, however, and what should remain at the forefront of USSF’s and FIFA’s minds when making decisions about compensation for women’s national teams, is the impact equal pay will have on the growth and development of the women’s game in the United States and across the globe.
* Sarah Pack is an associate attorney at Asiatico Law, PLLC, a boutique firm providing general counsel services to tax-exempt, nonprofit corporations. She is a graduate of the University of Michigan Law School and has a Master of Business Administration in Sport Entertainment Management from the University of North Texas. Thomas A. Baker III is a tenured Associate Professor of Sports Law in the Sports Management Program at the University of Georgia. Bob Heere is a Professor in the Department of Management in the G. Brint Ryan College of Business at the University of North Texas, and the Director of Sport Entertainment Management.
1 See Leah Asmelash & Brian Ries, These Stats Show How the USWNT Leads in Soccer – and How Far It Lags in Compensation, CNN (July 8, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/08/sport/uswnt-btn-equal-pay-trnd/index.html.
2 Id.
3 See Ryan Rosenblatt, United States World Cup History: What’s the Farthest the USMNT Have Progressed?, SB Nation (July, 1 2014), https://www.sbnation.com/soccer/2014/7/1/5861212/usa-belgium-2014-world-cup-history.
4 Jennifer Calfas, Why the U.S. Isn’t Competing in the 2018 World Cup, Time (Apr. 30, 2018), https://time.com/5258984/is-the-us-in-the-2018-world-cup/.
5 See Jonathan Tannenwald, Details of U.S. Soccer’s Budget for National Teams, NWSL, Phila. Inquirer (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/blogs/thegoalkeeper/Details-of-US-Soccers-budget-for-national-teams-NWSL.html.
6 Id.
7 Caitlin Murray, The National Team: The Inside Story of the Women Who Changed Soccer 166 (2019).
8 See generally id. at 250.
9 Nonprofit Explorer: United States Soccer Federation Inc, ProPublica, https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/135591991 (last visited Aug. 16, 2020).
10 Form 990 for the Year Ended March 31, 2019, U.S. Soccer Fed’n 1 (emphasis added), https://cdn.ussoccer.com/-/media/project/ussf/governance/2019/ussf_2018_990_pd-copy (last visited Aug. 16, 2020) [hereinafter USSF 2019 IRS Form 990].
11 See Andrew Das, Top Female Players Accuse U.S. Soccer of Wage Discrimination, N.Y. Times (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/01/sports/soccer/uswnt-us-women-carli-lloyd-alex-morgan-hope-solo-complain.html.
12 Id. This step is required in order to exhaust administrative remedies before a party can proceed with filing a federal employment discrimination lawsuit. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407 (2020).
13 Michael McCann, Inside USWNT’s New Equal Pay Lawsuit vs. U.S. Soccer–and How CBA, EEOC Relate, Sports Illustrated (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.si.com/soccer/2019/03/08/uswnt-lawsuit-us-soccer-equal-pay-cba-eeoc-gender-discrimination.
14 Hope Solo was the fifth USWNT player who filed an EEOC charge of discrimination. However, she was not a party to the lawsuit. USSF terminated her contract, forcing her to retire due to off-field incidents following the 2016 Summer Olympics. Andrew Das, U.S. Soccer Suspends Hope Solo and Terminates Her Contract, N.Y. Times (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/sports/hope-solo-suspended-for-six-months-by-us-soccer.html. As a result, she has pursued her own legal action against USSF. See Michael McCann, Key Elements in USWNT vs. U.S. Soccer: 2021 CBA Talks, the Hope Solo Case and More, Sports Illustrated (May 11, 2020), https://www.si.com/soccer/2020/05/11/uswnt-lawsuit-trial-appeal-hope-solo-case-cba-us-soccer.
15 Andrew Das, U.S. Women’s Soccer Team Sues U.S. Soccer for Gender Discrimination, N.Y. Times (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/08/sports/womens-soccer-team-lawsuit-gender-discrimination.html.
16 McCann, supra note 13.
17 See Grant Wahl, U.S. Women, U.S. Soccer Agree to New CBA, End Labor Dispute, Sports Illustrated (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.si.com/soccer/2017/04/05/uswnt-us-soccer-women-cba-labor-talks-agreement-1.
18 See ESPN Staff, USWNT Lawsuit Versus U.S. Soccer Explained: Defining the Pay Gaps, What’s at Stake for Both Sides, ESPN (June 3, 2020), https://www.espn.com/soccer/united-states-usaw/story/4071258/uswnt-lawsuit-versus-us-soccer-explained-defining-the-pay-gapswhats-at-stake-for-both-sides.
19 Steven Goff, The USWNT Victory Tour Begins, but the Larger Battle Remains over Equal Pay, Wash. Post (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2019/08/03/uswnt-victory-tour-begins-larger-battle-remains-over-equal-pay/.
20 Peter Keating, Analysis: What Equal Pay in Sports Really Means, as the Fight Goes on for U.S. Women’s Soccer, ESPN (May 14, 2020), https://www.espn.com/espnw/story/_/id/28971949/analysis-equal-pay-sports-really-means-fight-goes-us-women-soccer.
21 Id.
22 Josh Schafer, USWNT Victory Tour as Much About Equal Pay, Growing Women’s Soccer as It Is About a Trophy, Yahoo Sports (Aug. 6, 2019), https://sports.yahoo.com/uswnt-victory-tour-is-as-much-about-equal-pay-growing-womens-soccer-as-it-is-a-trophy-155256822.html.
23 See Morgan v. U.S. Soccer Federation, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 3d 635, 656, 663, 665 (C.D. Cal. 2020); Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Claims at 652, Morgan, 445 F. Supp. 3d 635 (No. 2:19-cv-01717), ECF No. 250. Only the part of Plaintiffs’ Title VII claim that related to (1) travel conditions and (2) personnel and support services survived. Morgan, 445 F. Supp. 3d at 665. See also infra note 162 and accompanying text.
24 See Michael McCann, The USWNT’s Lengthy Appeal Process and What Comes Next After Legal Setback, Sports Illustrated (May 5, 2020), https://www.si.com/soccer/2020/05/05/uswnt-us-soccer-lawsuit-appeal-chances-settlement-cba.
25 See Andrew Das, Can U.S. Soccer and Its Women’s Team Make Peace on Equal Pay?, N.Y. Times (May 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/02/sports/soccer/uswnt-equal-pay-women-soccer.html.
26 Id.
27 See, e.g., Murray, supra note 7.
28 See Liz Clarke, USWNT and Time’s Up Join Forces: ‘They’re Not Willing to Wait Any Longer,’ Wash. Post (Aug. 2, 2019, 4:53 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2019/08/02/uswnts-equal-pay-advocacy-arm-will-team-up-with-times-up-movement/.
29 See id.
30 See Des Bieler, Senate Bill Would Block Federal Funds for 2026 World Cup Until USWNT Gets Equal Pay, Wash. Post (July 10, 2019, 3:56 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2019/07/10/senate-bill-would-block-federal-funds-world-cup-until-uswnt-gets-equal-pay/.
31 See ESPN Staff, supra note 18.
32 In this Article, “club teams” or “clubs” refer to teams in domestic soccer leagues such as the NWSL, Major League Soccer, and the Football Association Women’s Super League in England. They are distinguished from national teams like the USWNT, which are made up of players from various clubs around the world who are eligible to represent their country in international competitions like the World Cup.
33 See id.
34 See McCann, supra note 13.
35 Id.
36 Friendly matches, or friendlies, refer to non-competitive, exhibition soccer games between two national teams. They are often scheduled leading up to a tournament to help fine-tune the squad or during intervals when there are no major tournaments to allow coaches to experiment with line ups.
37 See Meg Linehan, $67m in Damages: The Most Interesting Details of the Latest USWNT Equal Pay Filings, Athletic (Feb. 21, 2020), https://theathletic.com/1625872/2020/02/21/67m-in-damages-the-most-interesting-details-of-the-latest-uswnt-equal-pay-filings/.
38 See id.
39 See Alana Glass, Jeffrey Kessler on the USWNT and Their Fight for Equal Pay, Forbes (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alanaglass/2019/10/01/jeffrey-kessler-uswnt-and-their-fight-for-equal-pay/#2a8a161d78b5 (“As described in the court filing, if the men and women each played 20 friendly matches and won all of their games, the female players would earn a maximum of $99,000 or $4,950 per game. Meanwhile, the male players would earn an average of $263,320 or $13,166 per game. The compensation for a USWNT player would amount to just 38% of a similarly situated USMNT player.” Id.)
40 Defendant’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Claims at 6, Morgan v. United States Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 3d 635 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (No. 2:19-cv-01717), ECF No. 171.
41 Id. at 17–18.
42 Id. at 18.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 19.
45 The NWSL is the women’s professional soccer league in the U.S. There are currently nine clubs in the league, with plans to add two to three expansion clubs in the next two years. Despite the popularity of the USWNT, women’s soccer leagues have historically struggled in the U.S., prompting USSF to offer to subsidize some of the salaries and operations to ensure the financial health of this league at the outset. See Jamie Goldberg, National Women’s Soccer League Enters New Era with U.S. Soccer’s Role in League Set to Change, Oregonian (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.oregonlive.com/portland-thorns/2019/09/national-womens-soccer-league-enters-new-era-with-us-soccers-role-in-league-set-to-change.html. The relationship between USSF and the NWSL is explained in more detail below. See infra Section I.B.iii.
46 Defendant’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Claims, supra note 40, at 1–2.
47 Id. at 2.
48 Id. at 14–15.
49 The full five-year agreement has not previously been made publicly available. See Linehan, supra note 37.
50 U.S. Soccer Players, Statement About the USWNT 2017-2021 CBA, U.S. Nat’l Soccer Team Players Ass’n (Feb. 12, 2020), https://ussoccerplayers.com/2020/02/statement-about-the-uswnt-2017-2021-cba.html [hereinafter USMNT Statement].
51 See id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 U.S. Soccer Fed’n & U.S. Women’s Nat’l Team Players Ass’n, Collective Bargaining Agreement 2017-2021 art. 11(A)(5) (July 6, 2017) (on file with parties) [hereinafter 2017 USWNT CBA].
61 Id. at art. 6(D)(1).
62 Id. at art. 8(A)(1).
63 See id. at art. 11(A)(2).
64 Id. at art. 11(A)(3).
65 Id.; Id. at Exhibit A.
66 See id. at art. 11(A)(4).
67 See id. at art. 8(A)(2). In its opposition to the USWNT’s motion for summary judgment, USSF noted Brian’s contract was terminated in December 2019, but she continued to receive her annual salary as severance through the end of March 2020. See Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 6, Morgan v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 3d 635 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (No. 2:19-cv-01717), ECF No. 186.
68 See U.S. Soccer Fed’n & U.S. Nat’l Soccer Team Players Ass’n, Collective Bargaining Agreement 2011-2018 Exhibit A (Nov. 23, 2011) (on file with parties) [hereinafter 2011 USMNT CBA].
69 See id at Ex. A, § X.
70
Defendant’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Claims, supra note 40, at 17–19.
71 Id. at 18–19.
72 2011 USMNT CBA, supra note 68, at Exhibit A, § XVI.
73 See 2017 USWNT CBA, supra note 60, at Exhibit A.
74 Compare id. with 2011 USMNT CBA, supra note 68, at Exhibit A, § XVI.
75 See Leander Schaerlaeckens, How the NWSL Made American Women’s Pro Soccer History, Yahoo Sports (Apr. 16, 2016), https://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/soccer-fc-yahoo/nwsl-makes-history-with-fourth-season-054334254.html.
76 See id.
77 2017 USWNT CBA, supra note 60, at art. 9(C)(1)(a), Ex. A.
78 Jamie Goldberg, National Women’s Soccer League Enters New Era with U.S. Soccer’s Role in League Set to Change, Oregonian (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.oregonlive.com/portland-thorns/2019/09/national-womens-soccer-league-enters-new-era-with-us-soccers-role-in-league-set-to-change.html.
79 See Grant Wahl, NWSL Hires Lisa Baird as New Commissioner, Sports Illustrated (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.si.com/soccer/2020/02/27/nwsl-commissioner-lisa-baird.
80 2017 USWNT CBA, supra note 60, at art. 2, art. 26.
81 See USMNT Statement, supra note 50.
82 Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 3–4, Morgan v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 3d 635 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (No. 2:19-cv-01717-RGK-AGR), ECF No. 171.
83 Id. at 25.
84 See FIFA – Soccer’s World Governing Body, U.S. Soccer, https://www.ussoccer.com/history/organizational-structure/fifa (last visited Jan. 22, 2021).
85 FIFA Member Associations, FIFA, https://www.fifa.com/associations/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2021).
86 See Host of the World’s Game, U.S. Soccer, https://www.ussoccer.com/history/organizational-structure/concacaf (last visited Jan. 23, 2021).
87 Federation Internationale de Football Association, ProPublica, https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/980132529 (last visited Jan. 23, 2021); The ‘Three Pillars’ of FIFA’s Mission, FIFA (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.fifa.com/who-we-are/videos/the-three-pillars-of-fifa-s-mission-2863856.
88 The ‘Three Pillars’ of FIFA’s Mission, supra note 87.
89 FIFA, Making Football Truly Global: The Vision 2020-2023, at 4 (2020), https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/making-football-truly-global-the-vision-2020-2023.pdf?cloudid=z25oyskjgrxrudiu7iym [hereinafter FIFA Vision 2020-2023].
90 Press Release, FIFA, More than Half the World Watched Record-Breaking 2018 World Cup (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/more-than-half-the-world-watched-record-breaking-2018-world-cup.
91 Id.
92 28 Years of Women’s World Cup History, FIFA (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.fifa.com/womensworldcup/news/28-years-of-women-s-world-cup-history; Publicis Sport & Entertainment, FIFA Women’s World Cup France 2019: Global Broadcast and Audience Report 2–3 (2019), https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/rvgxekduqpeo1ptbgcng.pdf.
93 Publicis Sport & Entertainment, supra note 92, at 2–3.
94 Id. at 2.
95 Stephen Battaglio, Super Bowl 2020 Scores 99.9 Million TV Viewers with Chiefs Comeback, L.A. Times (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/business/story/2020-02-03/super-bowl-2020-scores-99-9-million-tv-viewers-with-chiefs-comeback.
96 See Richard Asfour, Gender Pay Inequality in World Cup Prize Pools and International Football, Everything Money: Your Guide to Money Behind 2019 Women’s World Cup, https://sites.duke.edu/2019womensworldcupfinances/how-countries-pay-their-players/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2021).
97 FIFA, Off the Pitch: Trophies, Awards and More. . .: Statistical Kit 4 (2018).
98 FIFA, Statistical Kit: FIFA Women’s World Cup France 2019 60 (2019).
99 Nick Friend, FIFA to Double Women’s World Cup Prize Money, Sports Pro Media (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.sportspromedia.com/news/fifa-womens-world-cup-prize-money.
100 Id.
101 Niall McCarthy, The Gender Pay Gap at the FIFA World Cup Is $370 Million [Infographic], Forbes (June 11, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2019/06/11/the-gender-pay-gap-at-the-fifa-world-cup-is-370-million-infographic/#6126dbd12751. According to the Australian players union, which represents both the men’s and women’s national soccer teams, the gap is adjusted to $336 million when factoring in the lower number of teams in the women’s tournament. See Grant Wahl, Australia Players Union Writes to FIFA over ‘Discrimination’ in WWC Prize Money, Sports Illustrated (June 3, 2019), https://www.si.com/soccer/2019/06/03/australia-players-union-fifa-womens-world-cup-prize-money-discrimination.
102 Friend, supra note 99.
103 Id.
104 See Cork Gaines, There Is an Enormous Disparity in How Much Prize Money FIFA Pays in the Men’s and Women’s World Cups, Bus. Insider, (June 26, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/fifa-womens-world-cup-prizes-2015-6.
105 Id.
106 Christian Radnedge, Soccer: FIFA Approves Prize Money Increase for 2019 Women’s World Cup, Reuters, (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-soccer-fifa-women/soccer-fifa-approves-prize-money-increase-for-2019-womens-world-cup-idUSKCN1N01RV.
107 Id.
108 ‘Is It Too Much to Ask?’ Matildas Take Fight to FIFA over Fair Women’s World Cup Pay, Guardian (June 3, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2019/jun/04/is-it-too-much-to-ask-matildas-take-fight-to-fifa-over-fair-womens-world-cup-pay.
109 See Rob Harris, FIFA Has $2.7 Billion in Cash, but Won’t Fix Women’s World Cup Prize Money Gap, Phila. Inquirer (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/soccer/fifa-world-cup-prize-money-women-jill-ellis-20190307.html. Infantino further indicated the difference in prize money boils down to differences in revenue generated by the men and women. However, much of FIFA’s revenue from these events is derived from sponsorships, which are not sold separately for the two tournaments. See id.
110 See Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 67, at 23.
111 See Linehan, supra note 37; discussion infra Section III.B.
112 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 190–91 (1974) (finding a violation of the EPA where male nightshift workers were paid higher wages than female dayshift workers).
113 Id. at 195–97.
114 Id. at 195 (quoting S. Rep. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1963)).
115 Shultz v. American Can Co.-Dixie Products, 424 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 1970) (quoting Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir. 1970) (holding an employer violated the EPA by paying female machine operators who worked exclusively on the day shift twenty cents an hour less than male night-shift operators who performed nearly identical work)).
116 Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 208.
117 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
118 Id.
119 See Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 195.
120 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13(a) (2020).
121 Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Stopped at the Starting Gate: The Overuse of Summary Judgment in Equal Pay Cases, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 815, 831 (2013) [hereinafter Thompson Eisenberg, Stopped at the Starting Gate].
122 Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 196.
123 29 C.F.R. § 1620.12(a) (2020).
124 29 C.F.R. § 1620.10 (2020).
125 29 C.F.R. § 1620.10 (2020); 29 C.F.R. § 1620.11(a) (2020).
126 See, e.g., Bence v. Detroit Health Corp., 712 F.2d 1024, 1027 (6th Cir. 1983) (rejecting an employer’s total remuneration argument because females were paid at a lower commission rate than males for selling the same health club memberships at a higher frequency), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); Ebbert v. Nassau Cnty., No. 05-CV-5445(FB)(AKT), 2009 WL 935812, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009) (“As a matter of common sense, total remuneration cannot be the proper point of comparison. If it were, an employer who pays a woman $10 per hour and a man $20 per hour would not violate the EPA or the NYEPA as long as the woman negated the obvious disparity by working twice as many hours. Neither Congress nor the New York Legislature could have intended such an absurd result.”).
127 Bence, 712 F.2d at 1027.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See id. at 1027–28.
131 Bertotti v. Philbeck, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 1005, 1010 (S.D. Ga. 1993).
132 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13(a) (2020).
133 Id.
134 29 C.F.R. § 1620.14(a) (2020).
135 29 C.F.R. § 1620.15(a) (2020).
136 29 C.F.R. § 1620.16(a) (2020).
137 29 C.F.R. § 1620.17(a) (2020).
138 29 C.F.R. § 1620.18(b) (2020).
139 29 C.F.R. § 1620.18(a) (2020).
140 Id.; see also Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 202 (1974).
141 Pfieffer v. Lewis Cnty., 308 F. Supp. 2d 88, 101–02 (N.D.N.Y. 2004).
142 E.E.O.C. v. Md. Ins. Admin., 879 F.3d 114, 121 (4th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted) (finding a prima facie case of wage discrimination where three female employees of an independent state agency earned less than at least one male comparator performing substantially equal work under similar working conditions).
143 See Thompson Eisenberg, Stopped at the Starting Gate, supra note 121, at 836.
144 Id. at 815–16.
145 Id. at 837.
146 29 C.F.R. § 1620.22 (2020).
147 29 C.F.R. § 1620.23 (2020) (“Any and all provisions in a collective bargaining agreement which provide unequal rates of pay in conflict with the requirements of the EPA are null and void and of no effect.”).
148 See, e.g., Perkins v. Rock-Tenn Servs., Inc., 700 F. App’x 452, 457 (6th Cir. 2017) (“There is no question that the decisions made as a result of negotiations between union and employer are made for legitimate business purposes; thus, a wage differential resulting from status as a union member constitutes an acceptable ‘factor other than sex’ for purposes of the Equal Pay Act.”).
149 Thompson Eisenberg, Stopped at the Starting Gate, supra note 121, at 816 (citing Brobst v. Columbus Servs. Int’l, 761 F.2d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1985)).
150 Id.
151 Id. at 817.
152 Id.
153 Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass Ceiling, 63 SMU L. Rev. 17, 34 (2010) [hereinafter Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Glass Ceiling].
154 Thompson Eisenberg, Stopped at the Starting Gate, supra note 121, at 831.
155 Id. at 839.
156 Id. at 831, 33.
157 Id. at 833.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 835.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 See id. at 834.
163 See, e.g., Derek Helling, Summary Judgment Would Give Either Side Tremendous Pull in USWNT Labor Dispute, Advocacy for Fairness in Sports (Feb. 29, 2020), https://advocacyforfairnessinsports.org/current-litigation/current-miscellaneous-cases/summary-judgment-would-give-either-side-tremendous-pull-in-uswnt-labor-dispute/; Michael McCann, Coronavirus, New U.S. Soccer Leadership and Their Impact on USWNT’s Lawsuit, Sports Illustrated (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.si.com/soccer/2020/03/25/us-soccer-uswnt-lawsuit-coronavirus-summary-judgment-trial-date. With respect to the USWNT’s Title VII claims, the court granted USSF’s motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. Morgan v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 3d 635, 665 (C.D. Cal. 2020). The USWNT argued USSF violated Title VII by paying female players less than similarly situated male players and subjecting them to unequal working conditions in three areas—field surfaces, travel conditions (charter flights and hotels), and support services (medical and training support). Id. at 656–65. The court already held the USWNT was not paid less than the USMNT in its analysis of the EPA claims and thereby granted summary judgment to USSF on this point under Title VII as well. Id. at 657. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of USSF regarding the USWNT’s claim USSF subjected the women’s team to less favorable (and more dangerous) field surfaces more frequently than the men’s team, finding the USWNT presented insufficient evidence that USSF’s proffered reasons for the discrepancy (competitive advantage and scheduling necessities) were merely pretext for discrimination Id. at 663. Conversely, the court found the USWNT did raise a genuine issue as to USSF’s pretext regarding the claim that USSF provided charter flights more frequently to the USMNT than to the USWNT. Id. at 665. As a result, this claim, along with the claims regarding travel conditions and support services, which were not addressed by USSF in its motion for summary judgment, will proceed to trial. See id. at 665.
164 Morgan, 445 F. Supp. 3d at 652.
165 Id.
166 See id. at 652–56.
167 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 6–7, Morgan v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, 445 F. Supp. 3d 365 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (No. 2:19-CV-01717-RGK-AGR), ECF No. 170.
168 See Morgan v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 3d 635, 653 (C.D. Cal. 2020).
169 See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 167, at 7–8.
170 See Class Certification Ord. at 5, Morgan v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 3d 365 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (No. 2:19-CV-01717-RGK-AGR), ECF No. 98.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 5–6 (citing Ebbert v. Nassau Cnty., No. 05-CV-5445(FB)(AKT), 2009 WL 935812, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009)).
173 See Morgan v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 445 F.Supp.3d 635, 653–54 (C.D. Cal. 2020).
174 Id. at 654.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1620.12(a) (2019); 29 C.F.R. § 1620.11(a) (2019); Diamond v. T Rowe Price Assocs., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 372, 395 (D. Md. 1994) (granting summary judgment to employer on plaintiff’s EPA claim where plaintiff did not receive stock options and larger annual bonuses but did receive more total compensation than her comparators)).
178 Id. at 655 (noting in labor negotiations the USWNT union rejected the pay-to-play structure of the USMNT CBA and was willing to forgo higher bonuses to secure other guaranteed compensation and benefits not provided in the men’s CBA).
179 See supra Section I.C.
180 See Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 67, at 20–21.
181 Id. at 18.
182 See Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 21, Morgan v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 3d 635 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (No. 2:19-cv-01717-RGK-AGR), ECF No. 171.
183 See Linehan, supra note 37.
184 See Das, supra note 25 (“By failing to qualify for the only men’s World Cup played during the class window, the men became ineligible for millions of dollars in performance bonuses of their own. Those payments would have swelled their paydays from U.S. Soccer far beyond what the women could ever earn.”).
185 Morgan v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 3d 635, 655 (C.D. Cal. 2020).
186 See id. at 655.
187 Legal scholar Steven Bank has criticized the USWNT’s argument that they would have received higher compensation under the USMNT CBA, characterizing it as “cherry picking the most favorable argument” and noting “comparing CBAs on upside only (when the WNT wins) ignores downside (when the WNT loses).” Steven Bank (@ProfBank), Twitter (May 2, 2020, 12:25 PM), https://twitter.com/ProfBank/status/1256636027369746433.
188 See Glass, supra note 39.
189 See Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 182, at 14–15.
190 See Morgan, 445 F. Supp. 3d at 655 (“This method of comparison not only fails to account for the choices made during collective bargaining, it also ignores the economic value of the ‘insurance’ that [US]WNT players receive under their CBA.”)
191 See Thompson Eisenberg, Stopped at the Starting Gate, supra note 121, at 834.
192 See generally Benoit Merkt, Charitable Organisations in Switzerland: Overview, Westlaw (Mar. 1, 2020), https://content.next.westlaw.com/8-633-1801?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&__lrTS=20170607012756718&firstPage=true; Alyssa Dirusso, American Nonprofit Law in Comparative Perspective, 10 Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev. 39 (2011).
193 Women’s Football Mission, FIFA, https://www.fifa.com/womens-football/mission/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2020) [hereinafter FIFA Women’s Soccer Mission].
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 See FIFA Vision 2020-2023, supra note 89, at 22.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 182, at 1.
202 U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., Bylaws of the United States Soccer Fed’n, Inc. art. 102(1) (last updated May 1, 2020), https://cdn.ussoccer.com/-/media/project/ussf/governance/2020/bylaws/202021-bylaw-book_final.ashx?la=en-us&rev=42540dd47a7f4c3eba252b8ae8bda610&hash=C6D2CE954680C6C563BEABDCFED9A7B0.
203 USSF 2019 IRS Form 990, supra note 10.
204 Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 81, at 1.
205 FIFA Women’s Soccer Mission, supra note 193.
206 For example, a 2017 research study found that individuals who previously viewed at least one professional women’s soccer match were much more likely to watch a women’s soccer event in the future. Lindsey Darvin & Michael Sagas, Objectification in Sport Media: Influences on a Future Women’s Sporting Event, 10 Int’l J. Sport Comm. 178, 191 (2017). “[T]hese results suggest that previously viewing at least one women’s professional soccer event drastically affected an individual’s event expectancies and future viewership intentions.” Id.
207 See Meg Linehan, USWNT Qualify for Olympics, Easily as Ever (and That’s a Problem), Athletic (Feb. 9, 2020), https://theathletic.com/1595197/2020/02/09/uswnt-qualify-for-olympics-easily-as-ever-and-thats-a-problem/. Of the qualifying tournament, goalkeeper Ashlyn Harris stated “I always respect my opponents[.] . . . I just want the best for women. I want them to have the same opportunities that I had, and I know that’s difficult. I know they probably don’t have the voice I do. If I can urge these federations in CONCACAF to continue to invest in these women’s teams to give them a better chance to succeed, I think that’s the goal. I’m rooting for them. I want everyone to have the access that I do. I also know that’s not realistic, and that sucks.” Id.
208 Id.
209 See Dan Wetzel, No Place for Orange Slices: Why USWNT Was Right to Run Up Score Against Thailand, Yahoo! Sports (June 11, 2019), https://sports.yahoo.com/why-uswnt-was-right-to-run-up-score-against-thailand-020720143.html.
210 Aimee Lewis, US Defends Itself After Humiliating Thailand at Women’s World Cup, CNN (June 12, 2019, 6:56 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/11/football/uswnt-womens-world-cup-thailand-record-spt-intl/index.html.
211 Id.
212 See id.
213 Id.
214 Rachel Bachman, U.S. Women’s Soccer Games Outearned Men’s Games, Wall St. J. (June 17, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-womens-soccer-games-out-earned-mens-games-11560765600.
215 Meg Kelly, Are U.S. Women’s Soccer Players Really Earning Less than Men?, Wash. Post (July 8, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/08/are-us-womens-soccer-players-really-earning-less-than-men/.
216 Caitlin Murray, Why Nike Didn’t Have Enough USWNT World Cup Jerseys to Meet Demand — and What It Cost the Players and Fans, Yahoo! Sports (Oct. 10, 2019), https://sports.yahoo.com/why-nike-didnt-have-enough-uswnt-world-cup-jerseys-to-meet-demand-and-what-it-cost-the-players-and-fans-171933947.html.
217 Grant Wahl, USWNT Invisible Crest Protest Becomes Hit T-Shirt–and Example of Players’ Revenue Potential, Sports Illustrated (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.si.com/soccer/2020/03/16/uswnt-protest-us-soccer-tshirt-crest-four-stars.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 The Ballon d’Or is one of the most prestigious individual awards in international soccer, typically awarded to the player considered to be the best in the world that year. See Sarah Mervosh & Andrew Das, Ada Hegerberg Won the Ballon d’Or. Then She Was Asked if She Knew How to Twerk, N.Y. Times (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/03/sports/soccer/ada-hegerberg-ballon-dor.html.
222 Grant Wahl, The Intricacies and Ever-Changing Landscape of the Global Market for Women’s Players, Sports Illustrated (July 6, 2019), https://www.si.com/soccer/2019/07/06/global-market-womens-soccer-players-uswnt-europe-nwsl. Hegerberg is Norwegian and famously has refused to play for her national team since August 2017 over equal pay concerns. Kellen Becoats, Nike Signs Soccer Star Ada Hegerberg Away from Puma with ‘Game Changer’ Step Toward Equal Pay, Forbes (June 8, 2020, 11:11 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellenbecoats/2020/06/08/nike-signs-ada-hegerberg-lyon-equal-pay/#13bd4b843f84. The Norwegian federation’s equal pay journey is discussed in Sections V.A and V.B, infra.
223 Wahl, supra note 217.
224 Lionel Messi, FC Barcelona, https://www.fcbarcelona.com/en/football/first-team/players/4974/lionel-messi (last visited Jan. 23, 2021); Conor Pope, Here Are the Highest Paid Women’s Footballers in the World – and How They Compare to the Highest Paid Men, FourFourTwo (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.fourfourtwo.com/us/news/highest-paid-women-footballers-ada-hegerberg-lyon.
225 See Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Glass Ceiling, supra note 153, at 34.
226 See Das, supra note 25.
227 See Graham Hays, U.S. Soccer Chief Apologizes for ‘Offense and Pain’ as USWNT Protests, ESPN (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.espn.com/soccer/united-states-usaw/story/4072953/us-soccer-chief-apologizes-for-offense-and-pain-as-uswnt-protest.
228 See Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 67, at 11.
229 Id.
230 See Kevin Draper & Andrew Das, ‘Blatant Misogyny’: U.S. Women Protest, and U.S. Soccer President Resigns, N.Y. Times (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/sports/soccer/uswnt-equal-pay.html.
231 See id.
232 Hays, supra note 227.
233 See id.
234 See Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 67, at 15.
235 See Hays, supra note 227.
236 Draper & Das, supra note 230.
237 Id.
238 See ESPN Staff, supra note 18.
239 Id.; See also Das, supra note 25.
240 See Michael McCann, U.S. Soccer’s Financial Standing a Wild Card with Regard to USWNT Lawsuit, Sports Illustrated (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.si.com/soccer/2020/04/21/us-soccer-finances-loan-uswnt-equal-pay-lawsuit.
241 See Das, supra note 25.
242 See Grant Wahl, Op-Ed: If the Goal Is Equity, the U.S. Women and Men Should Team Up to Bargain with U.S. Soccer, L.A. Times (July 17, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-07-17/equal-pay-soccer-womens-national-soccer-team-world-cup.
243 See Grant Wahl, What FIFA and the Rest of the World Can Learn from Norway’s Equitable Pay Agreement, Sports Illustrated (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.si.com/soccer/2017/10/08/fifa-women-soccer-equal-pay-norway-gianni-infantino.
244 Id. It should be noted, the Norwegian CBA may have been negotiated with an eye toward equal pay in large part to entice Ada Hegerberg to resume playing for the national team ahead of the 2019 Women’s World Cup, but she was not satisfied with this equitable solution and opted not to play in the World Cup. See Bonnie D. Ford, Why You Won’t See Ada Hegerberg, the World’s Best Player, at the Women’s World Cup, ESPN (June 5, 2019), https://www.espn.com/soccer/fifa-womens-world-cup/story/3867349/why-you-wont-see-ada-hegerbergthe-worlds-best-playerat-the-womens-world-cup.
245 See Wahl, supra note 242.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 USMNT Statement, supra note 50.
251 See id.
252 Wahl, supra note 242.
253 Id.
254 See Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support at 14, Morgan v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 3d 635, (C.D. Cal. 2020) (No. 2:19-cv-01717-RGK-AGR), ECF No. 170.
255 Kevin Draper, Pushed by Consumers, Some Sponsors Join Soccer’s Fight over Equal Pay, N.Y. Times (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/sports/soccer/womens-soccer-nike-sponsors.html.
256 Id.
257 See id.; Secret Deodorant (@secretdeodorant), Twitter (July 14, 2019, 5:25 AM), https://twitter.com/SecretDeodorant/status/1150335540354584576?s=20.
258 See, e.g., Meg Linehan, Angel City’s Alexis Ohanian and Julie Uhrman on a Shared Vision for NWSL in LA, Athletic (July 21, 2020), https://theathletic.com/1941373/2020/07/21/ohanian-uhrman-angel-city-nwsl-la/.
259 See NWSL’s Reign FC Acquired by French Powerhouse OL Groupe, Associated Press (Dec. 19, 2019), https://apnews.com/b93abe08c972d931d3c58e5dd51a1b8b.
260 Avi Creditor, NWSL Reveals 2022 Los Angeles Expansion Team with Loaded Ownership Group, Sports Illustrated (July 21, 2020), https://www.si.com/soccer/2020/07/21/nwsl-los-angeles-expansion-angel-city-ownership-group.
261 See id.
262 Id.
263 Gillian R. Brassil, New Women’s Soccer Team, Founded by Women, Will Press Equal Pay Cause, N.Y. Times (July 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/sports/soccer/angel-city-fc-nwsl.html.
264 See Alexis Ohanian, Angel City: Initializing a Women’s Football Club in Los Angeles, Medium (July 29, 2020), https://medium.com/initialized-capital/angel-city-initializing-a-womens-football-club-in-los-angeles-bd226d17748.
265 Seth Vertelney, Lose the Battle, Win the War? Why USWNT’s Equal Pay Defeat Isn’t a Total Catastrophe, Goal (May 5, 2020), https://www.goal.com/en-us/news/uswnt-equal-pay-defeat-not-total-catastrophe/1jersb5mtfyw1fl9ndusayral.
266 In fact, England and Brazil, two elite federations, recently announced they have been paying their women’s and men’s players equally in terms of match fees, bonuses, and prizes. See Andrew Downie et al., England’s Men’s and Women’s Teams Receive Equal Pay, Says FA, Reuters (Sept. 3, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-soccer-brazil-pay/brazil-announces-equal-pay-for-mens-and-womens-national-teams-idUSKBN25U101.
267 Allison Cary, Falling in Love with France, Backline Soccer (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.backlinesoccer.com/post/falling-in-love-with-france.
268 See McCann, supra note 240; Arvind Sriram, FIFA to Release $150 Million to Member Associations Due to COVID-19 Pandemic, Reuters (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-soccer-fifa/fifa-to-release-150-million-to-member-associations-due-to-covid-19-pandemic-idUSKCN22623U. However, FIFA has announced its plan to invest $1 billion in women’s soccer from 2019 to 2022 will continue despite the financial impact of the coronavirus pandemic. Suzanne Wrack, FIFA Says Planned £800m Investment in Women’s Football Will Not Be Cut, Guardian (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2020/apr/20/fifa-says-1bn-investment-in-womens-football-will-not-be-cut.
269 ESPN Staff, Sudden Vanishing of Sports Due to Coronavirus Will Cost at Least $12 Billion, Analysis Says, ESPN (May 1, 2020), https://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/29110487/sudden-vanishing-sports-due-coronavirus-cost-least-12-billion-analysis-says.